Healy v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18542

Background

Plaintiffs are union electrical workers employed at McCormick Place who were terminated after MPEA contracted with Freeman and GES for in‑house electrical services and side agreements altered hiring practices.
The Union’s CBA (Article IV) established a referral pool and priority hiring for electrical workers; McCormick Place used a separate “McCormick Call” and had an informal conversion process from short‑ to long‑term work.
In 2011 the Illinois legislature amended the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority Act, prompting MPEA to let Freeman and GES supply electrical services; the Union then entered “Interpretive Side Letter” agreements allowing out‑of‑pool hiring.
Freeman and GES fired the Plaintiffs on August 15, 2011 and subsequently used MPEA‑provided in‑house electricians; Plaintiffs later learned of the side letters and filed grievances and suit.
Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a state law claim (Count IV) for intentional tortious interference with contracts against MPEA; the district court dismissed that claim as preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and Plaintiffs appealed only that dismissal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Plaintiffs’ Illinois tortious‑interference claim is preempted by § 301	Healy et al.: The state tort claim can proceed; they followed grievance procedure and brought a hybrid § 301 suit so federal court can hear the tort claim against MPEA	MPEA: Resolution of the tort claim requires interpreting the CBA, so § 301 preempts it and converts it into a § 301 claim	Preempted: The tort claim requires interpreting the CBA, so § 301 preempts it and converts it into a § 301 contract claim
Whether MPEA can be sued under § 301 after preemption	Plaintiffs: Even if preempted, procedural steps (grievances/hybrid suit) permit relief against MPEA	MPEA: It is a political subdivision and LMRA excludes states/political subdivisions from the definition of "employer," so it is immune from § 301 suits	Dismissed: MPEA is a political subdivision and immune from § 301 claims, so the preempted claim is extinguished
Whether Brazinski/Kimbro create an exception allowing the state tort claim to proceed	Plaintiffs: They followed the grievance/arbitration path described in those cases and thus can pursue the claim	Defendants: Those cases converted tort theories into § 301 claims and required arbitration/grievance steps; they do not permit suing an immune political subdivision under § 301	Rejected: Brazinski/Kimbro do not permit circumventing MPEA’s § 301 immunity; plaintiffs would at best have a § 301 claim, which MPEA cannot face
Whether the remedial gap justifies creating a federal tort remedy	Plaintiffs: Preemption plus immunity leaves them without a remedy against MPEA	MPEA/Defense: Supreme Court and § 301 jurisprudence foreclose creation of a federal tort remedy; courts cannot create jurisdiction where none exists	Rejected: Courts may acknowledge the gap but cannot create a new federal tort cause of action; Granite Rock controls

Key Cases Cited

Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (§ 301 grants federal jurisdiction over employer‑union contract disputes)
Allis‑Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (state law claims that require interpreting a CBA are preempted by § 301)
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (preemption when resolution requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement)
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (§ 301 preempts state law claims founded directly or indirectly on CBAs)
Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010) (Supreme Court refuses to create a federal tort remedy under § 301; state tort claim preempted)
Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1993) (state tort claims preempted and plaintiffs must pursue § 301 remedies via grievance/arbitration)
Kimbro v. PepsiCo, Inc., 215 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2000) (same principle; § 301 creates contract‑based remedies, not tort rights)
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (recognition of hybrid suits against employer and union for breach of CBA and duty of fair representation)
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) (describes the hybrid § 301 suit procedure)