Healey v. Haymond Law Firm, P.C., 174 Conn. App. 230

Healey worked as a medical malpractice attorney for Haymond Law Firm for ~17 years and agreed to reduced, part-time compensation arrangements in 2012 (50% of fees on retained cases; 15% of referral fees).
After settlements in 2013 and a later referral fee, Healey sought unpaid wages under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-72 and breach of contract; suit filed June 19, 2013.
While the action was pending, § 31-72 was amended (effective Oct. 1, 2015) to shift the burden to employers to prove a good-faith belief the underpayment complied with law, with double damages automatic unless employer proves good faith.
Both parties submitted jury charge requests quoting the amended statute; plaintiff asked the court to instruct using the amended language and defendant’s written request also quoted the amended statute. Defendant never sought instruction under the pre-amendment statute and repeatedly acquiesced at trial.
Jury found for Healey and awarded damages; trial court awarded attorney’s fees. On appeal defendant argued the court erred by instructing under the amended § 31-72 (retroactive application) and sought plain-error reversal.
Court of Appeals held defendant induced the instructional error by requesting/acquiescing to the amended-statute instruction and declined to review; plain-error relief was also denied because defendant failed to show manifest injustice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court should have instructed under the amended § 31-72 (applied retroactively)	Amended statute applied (plaintiff asked for amended-text instruction and burden on employer to prove good faith)	Court should have used pre-amendment statute in force when claim arose (burden on employee to prove bad faith)	Defendant induced instruction on amended statute; claim not reviewable
Whether defendant preserved objection to amended-statute instruction	Plaintiff: defendant agreed/waived by requesting and acquiescing to instruction	Defendant: now seeks to challenge retroactive application on appeal	Court: defendant induced the instruction and cannot complain on appeal
Whether plain-error review can remedy an induced instructional error	Plaintiff: even if considered, no manifest injustice shown	Defendant: alleged retroactive application was obvious error warranting reversal	Court: plain error not shown — defendant failed to demonstrate manifest injustice
Whether attorney’s fees award or other remedies required different handling under statute	Plaintiff: fees available under § 31-72 as applied	Defendant: contested whether fees are mandatory or discretionary under amended text	Court declined to disturb fee award; defendant only preserved an objection to mandatory-fees language, not to instruction applying amended statute

Ravetto v. Triton Thalassic Technologies, Inc., 285 Conn. 716 (interpretive rule that double damages under former § 31-72 are discretionary and require bad faith)
Somers v. LeVasseur, 230 Conn. 560 (plaintiff bears burden of proof in civil actions; burden to show bad faith under prior § 31-72 rested with employee)
State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447 (policy against allowing a party to reverse course on appeal when they induced trial error)
Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255 (party cannot complain on appeal when jury instructions track the party’s own requested charge)
State v. Cruz, 269 Conn. 97 (declining review where trial court adopted defendant’s requested instruction)
Gorelick v. Montanaro, 119 Conn. App. 785 (doctrine of induced/invited error barring appellate review)
State v. Darryl W., 303 Conn. 353 (plain error framework; tension over applying plain error to induced/waived claims)
State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802 (noting Kitchens waiver does not necessarily foreclose plain error relief)
State v. Schuler, 157 Conn. App. 757 (conceded induced instructional error did not rise to plain error)