Hazell v. Brown
2010 Ore. App. LEXIS 1295
| Or. Ct. App. | 2010Background
- Measure 47 (2006) imposes limits on contributions and expenditures and includes reporting/disclosure requirements; Measure 46 proposed a constitutional amendment.
- Vannatta I (1997) invalidated certain provisions of Measure 9 (1995) but sustained others, framing contributions and expenditures as expressive under Article I, section 8.
- Section 9(f) of Measure 47 provides that if the constitution does not allow limits on contributions or expenditures on the effective date, the act shall be codified and become effective when the constitution allows or is amended to allow such limits.
- Election results showed Measure 46 rejected, influencing the Secretary of State to deem Measure 47 dormant under section 9(f); Governor proclaimed Measure 47 in force, but enforcement was paused.
- Hazell and Horton plaintiffs sought enforcement of Measure 47; Center to Protect Free Speech and Vannatta intervenors argued section 9(f) makes the act void or dormant.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding Measure 47 not currently operative but validly deferred by section 9(f); plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article I, section 21 challenge to 9(f) | Intervenors claim 9(f) delegates legislative power unconstitutionally. | 9(f) is a valid contingent activation tied to constitutional change; not an improper delegation. | 9(f) survives; constitutional. |
| Article IV, section 1(4)(d) compliance | Dormant operative effect in 9(f) violates timing requirements. | Effective date and operative date are distinct; 47 became law when enacted, despite dormant operation. | No violation; 47 took effect and remained dormant as permitted. |
| Meaning of 'limitations on political campaign contributions or expenditures' in 9(f) | All contribution/expenditure restrictions in 47 (and related provisions) are the reference. | Referent is the unconstitutional limits identified in Vannatta I; 9(f) defers only those prohibitions. | Referent is the Vannatta I-type limits; the act remains dormant until allowed. |
| Constitutional context and voters' intent | Voters intended broader or different reach beyond Vannatta I. | Voters understood 9(f) to track constitutional permission for limits; context supports broader restraint. | Voters understood 9(f) to defer to constitutional permission; 47 not operative. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vannatta v. Oregon Government Ethics Comm., 347 Or. 449 (2009) (clarified aspects of Vannatta I; constitutional interpretation of campaign limits)
- Vannatta v. Keisling (Vannatta I), 324 Or. 514 (1997) (held certain campaign limits unconstitutional under Article I, §8)
- Vannatta v. Oregon Government Ethics Comm. (Vannatta II), 347 Or. 449 (2009) (refined Vannatta I; clarified limits discussion)
- Hecker, 109 Or. 520 (1923) (interpretation of 'shall take effect' vs. 'operate' in contingent statutes)
- Libby v. Olcott, 66 Or. 124 (1913) (contingent legislation and election timing considerations)
- Rathie v. State, 101 Or. 339 (1921) (contingent legislation with anticipated election effects)
- Marr v. Foley, 182 Or. 383 (1947) (contingent operation of taxes and referenda)
- Moyer, 348 Or. 220 (2010) (post-Vannatta analyses on campaign limits)