Hazel Enterprises, LLC v. Ray
510 S.W.3d 840
Ky. Ct. App.2017Background
- Hazel Enterprises, LLC purchased a certificate of delinquency for Ray’s 2010 property taxes and sued to foreclose and recover acquisition costs, fees, and attorney’s fees.
- The Warren Circuit Court entered a Final Judgment and Order of Sale on July 18, 2013 awarding Hazel $4,097.32 but the judge crossed out $350 in pre‑litigation fees in handwriting.
- Ray delivered a cashier’s check for the judgment amount on August 2, 2013; Hazel returned the check, asserting additional Master Commissioner fees and disputing the handwritten fee exclusion.
- Hazel did not appeal or seek reconsideration of the Final Judgment; the matter stalled and the property remained unsold for about 15 months.
- In October–November 2014 the trial court found Ray made a good‑faith attempt to comply and denied Hazel post‑judgment interest, also waiving some Commissioner fees; Hazel’s motion to reconsider was denied and Hazel appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether KRS 360.040 mandates post‑judgment interest at 12% for Hazel | KRS 360.040 gives Hazel an absolute right to 12% post‑judgment interest | Trial court has discretion under KRS 360.040 to reduce or deny interest, especially for unliquidated judgments | Court held statute allows discretion; interest is not mandatory and may be reduced/denied |
| Whether damages here are liquidated or unliquidated | Hazel implicitly treats award as liquidated and fixed | Ray argues award included fees/costs that are unliquidated and subject to judicial determination | Court held the award involved unliquidated elements (fees) so statute’s discretionary provision applies |
| Whether Ray’s tender tolled post‑judgment interest | Hazel argues rejection preserved accrual of interest | Ray argues his timely, good‑faith cashier’s check constituted compliance/tender that should prevent further interest | Court found Ray’s tender in good faith and Hazel’s rejection made denying interest equitable; no abuse of discretion |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in denying interest | Hazel contends denial is error as a matter of law | Ray contends court acted within discretion given statutory language and equities | Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion in denying post‑judgment interest |
Key Cases Cited
- Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 566 (Ky. 2009) (recognizes trial court discretion to set interest below statutory rate)
- Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2009) (same principle on judicial discretion over post‑judgment interest)
- Ensor v. Ensor, 431 S.W.3d 462 (Ky. App. 2014) (trial court may deny post‑judgment interest based on equities)
- Courtenay v. Wilhoit, 655 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. App. 1983) (discretion to deny statutory interest in appropriate cases)
- Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909 (Ky. 2004) (standard of review—abuse of discretion)
- Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000) (defines abuse‑of‑discretion review)
- Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hollon, 816 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. App. 1991) (tender by check/cash can toll post‑judgment interest)