Hayes v. Plumley, 2:15-cv-15636

Background

Larry Hayes was convicted by a jury in West Virginia of death of a child by a parent/guardian/custodian after an 18‑month‑old (R.M.) sustained a fatal skull fracture; he was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment plus 10 years supervised release.
Hayes gave a recorded October 4, 2010 statement to detectives (after a Miranda waiver) saying he fell down stairs with the child; the State admitted the statement at trial and medical experts testified the fracture was caused by high‑impact trauma while the child was in Hayes’s care.
Hayes raised four claims in his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition: (1) his October 4 statement was coerced (due process); (2) trial counsel was ineffective in cross‑examining the pathologist (Dr. Allen Mock); (3) trial counsel failed to adequately litigate insufficiency of the evidence; and (4) appellate counsel failed to raise those issues on direct appeal.
The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for the respondent; Hayes objected. The district court reviewed objections, adopted the PF&R largely, granted summary judgment, dismissed the § 2254 petition, but granted certificates of appealability on two issues (voluntariness of the October 4 statement and effectiveness of cross‑examination of Dr. Mock).
The court addressed exhaustion and procedural default, found the due‑process/coercion claim not fairly presented to the state courts (it was presented there as an ineffective‑assistance claim), but chose to decide that claim on the merits rather than resolve default.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hayes)	Defendant's Argument (Plumley/State)	Held
Voluntariness of October 4, 2010 statement (Due Process)	Hayes contends detectives coerced a confession by promising leniency and implying he could leave if he described the death as accidental	State argues Hayes knowingly waived Miranda, was told he was not under arrest, detectives made no explicit or illusory promises of exoneration, and totality of circumstances shows voluntariness	Court held statement was voluntary; no overborne will; evidence contradicted a promise of immediate release; claim denied (but COA granted as debatable)
Exhaustion / Procedural Bar	Hayes argues federal due‑process claim is cognizable despite state habeas framing as ineffective assistance	State notes Hayes presented coercion as IAC in state court (different legal theory), so due‑process claim was not fairly presented; may be procedurally defaulted under WV law	Court found the due‑process claim not fairly presented (unexhausted) but elected to decide the claim on the merits rather than resolve default
IAC for failure to challenge Dr. Mock’s qualifications (cross‑examination)	Hayes contends Dr. Mock lacked required board certification/fellowship and counsel was deficient for failing to expose that, prejudicing the outcome; seeks evidentiary hearing to develop facts	State contends counsel extensively cross‑examined Dr. Mock; even if fellowship issue true, Dr. Mock’s substantive opinions were supported by other medical testimony and jury would likely credit them	Court found state court did not make an adequate factual finding on the fellowship; §2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary hearing because Hayes diligently sought development in state court; but even assuming deficient performance, Hayes failed to show Strickland prejudice, so no relief — COA granted on this issue
IAC for failure to litigate insufficiency of evidence (motion for acquittal)	Hayes argues counsel did not properly or adequately press insufficiency of evidence regarding malice/intent	State points to trial record showing counsel did raise and renew motion for acquittal and argued insufficiency (including at post‑trial hearing); state court found ample evidence	Court held counsel did challenge sufficiency and performance was not deficient; AEDPA deference to state court denial of prejudice was appropriate; claim denied (no COA)

Key Cases Cited

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (defines “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” under AEDPA)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (deference to state court decisions applying Strickland under AEDPA)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence — rational trier of fact)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (exhaustion and procedural default principles in habeas cases)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (totality‑of‑circumstances test for voluntariness of waiver/confession)
Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (requirements for federal review and standard for rebutting state factual findings)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (Miranda waiver implications for voluntariness challenges)