Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023

Background

In 2011 Illinois enacted 20 ILCS 2105/2105-165, mandating automatic, permanent revocation of health-care licenses for certain convictions (including patient battery and offenses requiring sex-offender registration), effective August 20, 2011.
Three licensees (Hayashi, Jafari, Khaleeluddin) had prior misdemeanor convictions involving patient sexual or physical misconduct and either had prior Department discipline or reinstatement before the 2011 law.
After the statute’s effective date the Department notified and then revoked their licenses under section 2105-165 without a pre-revocation hearing.
The licensees sued for declaratory and injunctive relief raising statutory-construction and multiple constitutional challenges; the circuit court dismissed under section 2-615 and the appellate court affirmed.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave, consolidated the appeals, and affirmed the dismissals, rejecting all challenges to application of section 2105-165.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Temporal reach / statutory construction — Does §2105-165 apply to convictions before effective date?	The statute lacks clear expression to reach pre‑enactment convictions; therefore it should not apply to them.	The statute’s phrasing (“has been convicted”) unambiguously reaches past or present convictions.	Held: Statute’s plain language applies to convictions predating enactment.
2. Substantive due process / retroactivity — Is application retroactive or an unconstitutional impairment of rights?	Applying the law to past convictions is retroactive and impairs vested rights (repose), violating substantive due process.	The law is prospective in operation (revocation occurs after effective date); relying on antecedent facts does not make it retroactive.	Held: Not retroactive under Landgraf; statute creates new present/future eligibility rules and survives rational-basis review.
3. Procedural due process — Is mandatory revocation without a hearing unconstitutional?	Licensees are entitled to a hearing to contest facts and circumstances of the underlying conduct.	Conviction is a public-record fact; administrative procedures (written response and narrow vacation grounds) satisfy due process given low risk of erroneous deprivation and strong public interest.	Held: No procedural due process violation; existing written procedures and ability to seek vacation suffice.
4. Res judicata / prior discipline — Do earlier disciplinary proceedings bar revocation under §2105-165?	Prior Department discipline (and reinstatement) precludes further punishment for same conduct; res judicata or vested reliance should bar revocation.	Prior proceedings arose under different law and different remedies; §2105-165 creates a new cause of action and eligibility standard not litigated previously.	Held: Res judicata does not apply because the causes of action differ; no vested right to be free from subsequent licensing-eligibility changes.

Key Cases Cited

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1994) (test for retroactive application of statutes)
Potts v. Illinois Dep’t of Registration & Education, 128 Ill. 2d 322 (Ill. 1989) (professional license is property for procedural due process; not a fundamental right for substantive due-process scrutiny)
Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221 Ill. 2d 453 (Ill. 2006) (statutory construction: give plain language its ordinary meaning)
Smith v. Dep’t of Registration & Education, 412 Ill. 332 (Ill. 1952) (license to practice medicine is a property right for due-process purposes)
Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520 (Ill. 2004) (res judicata prevents relitigation; elements required)