2017 Ohio 8261
Ohio Ct. App.2017Background
- Dianna Hay was hired as a loan officer in July 2015 and alleged repeated unwanted sexual advances, texts/pictures, invasion of personal space, a photo taken of her backside, threats, and at least one physical incident by coworker/supervisor Eddie Hughes; supervisor John Beasley allegedly discouraged reporting.
- Hay reported the conduct to HR; an investigation purportedly confirmed Hughes acted inappropriately, and Hay was terminated shortly thereafter; she alleged wrongful termination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, retaliation, defamation, and related torts.
- Defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an employment arbitration agreement Hay signed at hire; the agreement allowed arbitration for "claims for discrimination (on the basis of, but not limited to, race, sex...)" but did not explicitly say "sexual harassment."
- The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding Hay’s sexual harassment claims were outside the arbitration clause’s scope because the clause used "sexual discrimination" rather than the specific phrase "sexual harassment."
- The appellate court reviewed de novo whether Hay’s sexual harassment claim fell within the arbitration agreement and concluded sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under federal and Ohio law and therefore within the arbitration clause; it reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hay’s sexual harassment claims are covered by the arbitration clause that referenced "sex discrimination" but not the phrase "sexual harassment" | Hay: "Sexual harassment" is distinct from generalized "sex discrimination" and was not expressly waived; therefore claims are not subject to arbitration | Defs: Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII and R.C. 4112 and thus falls within the arbitration clause covering discrimination claims | Court: Sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination; arbitration clause’s "sex discrimination" language reasonably encompasses sexual harassment, so claims are arbitrable |
Key Cases Cited
- Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (U.S. 1986) (establishes that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII)
- Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc., 89 Ohio St.3d 169 (Ohio 2000) (recognizes quid pro quo and hostile work environment as forms of sexual-harassment-based discrimination under R.C. 4112.02)
- Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352 (Ohio 2008) (explains de novo review and arbitration-contract principles)
- Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464 (Ohio 1998) (discusses strong presumption favoring arbitration)
- Kilgore v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 172 Ohio App.3d 387 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (applies R.C. 4112.02 to include sexual harassment as sex discrimination)
- Persichillo v. Motor Carrier, 156 Ohio App.3d 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (applies Hampel’s framework to R.C. 4112 claims)