Hawley v. First Security Bancorp
2011 Ark. App. 538
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Hawley, 59, employed as a bank teller, suffered a fall on September 11, 2008, while exiting her work building, injuring her right knee, right elbow, and lower back.
- Emergency room records noted knee and elbow injuries with no objective back findings initially; lumbar MRI and x-ray results were later discussed.
- Dr. Wilson treated Hawley for back pain in September 2008, diagnosing a lumbar strain and predicting recovery without restrictions.
- Dr. Hanby assessed knee injury and recommended six weeks of limited activity; Hawley’s FMLA form indicated work leave through November 5, 2008.
- Hawley sought treatment from Dr. Cyril Raben in September 2009; MRI showed disc desiccation and potential herniation, leading to further treatment recommendations.
- The ALJ found Hawley sustained compensable injuries (knee contusion and lumbar strain) but denied post-September 2009 medical treatment as not reasonably necessary or causally connected to the 2008 fall; the Commission affirmed this ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causation between the 9/11/2008 fall and 9/2009 MRI findings | Hawley argues the back pain began immediately after the fall and continued. | Raben’s conclusions show possible linkage but lack certainty; other physicians found aging degenerative changes. | Substantial evidence supports no causal connection to the 2008 fall for the 2009 MRI findings. |
| Sufficiency of medical certainty for causation testimony | Dr. Raben’s opinion linked injuries to the fall with certainty. | Raben’s opinion used speculative language (“could have been”) not medical certainty. | Medical opinions using could/may/possibly do not meet the required certainty. |
| Reasonableness of ongoing treatment after 9/9/2009 | Treatments prescribed by Raben were necessary to diagnose and treat compensable injury. | Treatments were not shown to be reasonably necessary or causally connected to the compensable injury. | Substantial evidence supports denial of post-2009 treatment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Evans v. Bemis Co., Inc., 374 S.W.3d 51 (Ark. App. 2010) (substantial-evidence standard in workers’ compensation appeals)
- Jordan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 911 S.W.2d 593 (Ark. App. 1995) (medical causation burden; reasonable certainty required)
- General Elec. Railcar Repair Servs. v. Hardin, 969 S.W.2d 667 (Ark. App. 1998) (assignment of credibility to medical opinions; fact question for Commission)
- Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 20 S.W.3d 284 (Ark. 2000) (physician certainty standard for medical opinions)
- Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 40 S.W.3d 760 (Ark. 2001) (causation proof; reasonable certainty requirement)
- Heptinstall v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 137 S.W.3d 421 (Ark. App. 2003) (medical evidence sufficiency for causation)
- Hernandez v. Wal-Mart Assoc., Inc., 337 S.W.3d 531 (Ark. App. 2009) (credibility and weight of medical evidence; court deferential to Commission)