Hauser v. Fort Hudson Nursing Ctr., Inc.
2021 NY Slip Op 07325
| N.Y. App. Div. | 2021Background
- Decedent Bert D. Butler Sr. was a resident of Fort Hudson Nursing Center; plaintiff (his estate's administrator) sued for: violation of Public Health Law § 2801-d, negligence/gross negligence, conscious pain and suffering, and wrongful death.
- Before trial plaintiff submitted a proposed verdict sheet; defendants moved in limine to (1) prevent separate interrogatories treating physical harm, emotional harm and death under PHL § 2801-d and wrongful-death/survivorship claims, and (2) bar cumulative recovery under PHL § 2801-d together with survivorship/wrongful-death pain-and-suffering damages.
- Supreme Court denied the motion in limine; on reargument the court adhered to its ruling. Defendants appealed those orders.
- Central legal questions: whether PHL § 2801-d’s definition of “injury” includes death; whether PHL § 2801-d damages can be recovered in addition to wrongful-death/survivorship tort damages; and whether statutory minimum per-day awards apply to death.
- The Appellate Division affirmed: it held that PHL § 2801-d unambiguously includes death as an injury, that the statute permits concurrent recovery with other remedies (subject to prevention of double recovery for the same injury), and that the per‑day minimum award does not sensibly apply to death.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PHL § 2801-d’s definition of “injury” includes a patient’s death | Hauser: statute expressly lists “death of a patient” as an injury, so estate may sue for death | Fort Hudson: common law and wrongful-death/survivorship statutes limit post‑death recovery to survivors, so patient/estate cannot recover for decedent’s own death | Held: § 2801-d unambiguously includes death; estate may bring claim for decedent’s death under the statute |
| Whether PHL § 2801-d damages are limited to wrongful-death/survivorship measures | Hauser: § 2801-d provides independent compensatory (and punitive) remedies that are not confined to EPTL measures | Fort Hudson: compensatory damages should be confined to wrongful-death/survivorship frameworks, otherwise patient recovery for own death would be meaningless or duplicative | Held: § 2801-d is a statutory cause of action that can compensate death beyond wrongful‑death frameworks; statutory text controls |
| Whether PHL § 2801-d’s minimum per‑day award applies to a death claim | Hauser: the per‑day minimum applies to ongoing non‑death injuries but is nonsensical for death | Fort Hudson: minimum should apply uniformly to limit damages structure | Held: per‑day minimum is intended for continuing injuries and does not sensibly apply to death; applying it to death would be absurd |
| Whether plaintiff may recover under both § 2801-d and survivorship/wrongful‑death pain-and-suffering (double recovery) | Hauser: § 2801-d(4) makes remedies cumulative; pain-and-suffering under survivorship and § 2801-d are distinct and may both be pled | Fort Hudson: allowing both duplicates the same injury and invites double recovery | Held: Remedies are cumulative under § 2801-d(4); court may prevent double recovery for a single injury, but plaintiff may plead both theories and damages may be limited at or after trial based on proof |
Key Cases Cited
- Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653 (statutory text is the clearest indicator of legislative intent)
- Desiderio v. Ochs, 100 NY2d 159 (courts construe unambiguous statutory language according to plain meaning)
- Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 NY2d 622 (wrongful‑death statute creates distinct cause for survivors; common law does not permit direct suits for wrongful death)
- Doe v. Westfall Health Care Ctr., 303 AD2d 102 (§ 2801‑d was enacted to supplement common-law remedies and permit easier recovery for nursing‑home patients)
- McDougald v. Garber, 73 NY2d 246 (at common law loss-of-enjoyment damages require conscious awareness)
- Collado v. City of New York, 396 F. Supp. 3d 265 (analogy to § 1983: loss-of-life damages may be recoverable and serve deterrence)
