306 P.3d 592
Or.2013Background
- Gary Haugen was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death; this court affirmed his conviction and sentence in State v. Haugen, and an execution date was set.
- Governor Kitzhaber issued a reprieve suspending Haugen’s death sentence "for the duration of my service as Governor," citing concerns about the death penalty’s fairness and justice.
- Haugen wrote to the Governor purporting to reject the reprieve and sued for a declaratory judgment that the reprieve was invalid and ineffective.
- The trial court held that a reprieve must be accepted by the recipient to be effective and ruled the reprieve ineffective because Haugen had rejected it; the Governor appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court.
- The Oregon Supreme Court considered whether: (1) a reprieve must state an end date; (2) a reprieve may be granted only for particular purposes; (3) a reprieve must be accepted to be effective; and (4) the reprieve violated the Eighth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a reprieve must be accepted by the recipient to be effective | Haugen: acceptance is required; he rejected the reprieve, so it is ineffective | Kitzhaber: clemency is a constitutional executive power and effective without recipient acceptance | Held: Reprieve is valid and effective regardless of Haugen’s acceptance |
| Whether a reprieve must specify a definite end date | Haugen: reprieve here is indefinite and therefore invalid | Kitzhaber: temporary reprieve tied to Governor’s service is a definite, permissible term | Held: Reprieve need not state a calendar date; ending at end of governor’s service is definite enough |
| Whether reprieves may be granted only for particular historical reasons | Haugen: reprieves historically served narrow purposes; this reprieve targets laws and is improper | Kitzhaber: text/history permit broad plenary clemency power for public welfare reasons | Held: Reprieves need not be limited to historical reasons; Governor’s stated reasons are constitutionally permissible |
| Whether the reprieve violates the Eighth/Fourteenth Amendments by creating prolonged uncertainty | Haugen: indefinite uncertainty about execution date is additional punishment, cruel and unusual, and deprives liberty without due process | Kitzhaber: suspension of sentence is not punishment; no authority that execution-date uncertainty is Eighth Amendment violation | Held: Reprieve is not cruel and unusual punishment and does not violate due process on the theories raised |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Haugen, 349 Or 174 (Oregon 2010) (prior affirmance of conviction and sentence)
- Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (U.S. 1927) (clemency is part of constitutional scheme and need not depend on recipient consent)
- Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1915) (acceptance-of-pardon principle applied in context of a refused pardon)
- United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (U.S. 1833) (early characterization of pardon as deed requiring delivery and acceptance)
- Ex Parte Houghton, 49 Or 232 (Oregon 1907) (discussed conditional pardons/commutations and enforcement of conditions)
- Fredericks v. Gladden, 211 Or 312 (Oregon 1957) (discussion of Governor’s clemency power and related procedural issues)
- Eacret v. Holmes, 215 Or 121 (Oregon 1958) (recognizing limited judicial role in reviewing clemency discretion)