2016 Ohio 7597
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Oct. 2007: Hatfield (driver) and Gerald (passenger) injured in car crash caused by Melissa Whisman, an alleged uninsured motorist.
- Oct. 2009: Plaintiffs sued Whisman; obtained default judgment but voluntarily dismissed before damages hearing; refiled in Aug. 2012 and obtained default liability finding.
- Mar. 2015: Whisman’s insurer informed plaintiffs there was no coverage; May 2015 plaintiffs added Safe Auto (Hatfield’s insurer) under the policy’s uninsured-motorist (UM/UIM) coverage—more than seven years after the accident.
- Safe Auto moved for summary judgment relying on the policy clause requiring any UM/UIM suit to be filed within two years of the accident.
- Plaintiffs argued the two-year contractual limitation was unconscionable, partly because the policy required exhaustion/other prerequisites; they submitted no summary-judgment evidence supporting unconscionability.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for Safe Auto; plaintiffs appealed. Appellate court affirmed, holding the two-year limit enforceable and plaintiffs had opportunity but failed to present evidence under R.C. 1302.15(B).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of 2‑year contractual limitation for UM/UIM suit | Two‑year limit is unconscionable given policy terms and exhaustion requirements; plaintiffs shouldn’t be time‑barred | Two‑year limit is clear, reasonable, and routinely upheld; plaintiffs failed to present evidence of unconscionability | Court held the two‑year limitation enforceable and barred the claim |
| Effect of exhaustion/full‑compliance language on running of 2‑year period | Exhaustion of tortfeasor’s remedies prevents plaintiffs from suing insurer within two years | Exhaustion clauses are conditions precedent to payment, not tolling mechanisms that negate the contractual limitation | Court held exhaustion language does not render the two‑year limit ambiguous or unenforceable |
| Trial court’s obligation under R.C. 1302.15(B) to allow evidence on unconscionability | Court erred by not considering unconscionability evidence before granting summary judgment | Plaintiffs were afforded a reasonable opportunity via summary‑judgment process but failed to produce Civ.R.56(E) evidence | Court held no R.C.1302.15(B) violation; plaintiffs had opportunity but presented no evidence |
| Whether late‑raised arguments in reply (relief from two‑year rule) may be considered | Plaintiffs’ reply argument sought relief from the two‑year requirement | Safe Auto opposed consideration of new arguments raised only in reply | Court declined to consider arguments not assigned as error or raised first in appellant brief |
Key Cases Cited
- Angel v. Reed, 119 Ohio St.3d 73 (affirming reasonableness of two‑year contractual UM/UIM limitation)
- Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 403 (same)
- Miller v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St.3d 619 (same)
- Barbee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 130 Ohio St.3d 96 (exhaustion/full‑compliance provisions do not make two‑year UM/UIM limitation ambiguous)
- Westfield Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 128 Ohio St.3d 540 (standard: de novo review for insurance contract interpretation)
- Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 122 Ohio St.3d 63 (definition and burden of proof for unconscionability)