Hatcher v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University
829 F.3d 531
7th Cir.2016Background
- Dr. Laura Hatcher, an assistant professor at Southern Illinois University (hired 2006), was denied tenure in March 2012 and subsequently terminated. She appealed administratively (JRB) and filed an EEOC charge (Oct. 3, 2012) claiming sex discrimination.
- Tenure reviews at SIU proceeded through external reviewers, department vote (chair recommended tenure), COLA committee (close votes), dean (Kempf‑Leonard recommended denial for lack of peer‑reviewed publications), and provost (recommended denial). Chancellor Cheng issued the final denial Nov. 27, 2012.
- Around a year before tenure, Hatcher assisted a graduate student in reporting alleged faculty sexual harassment; she later asserted she believed she was required to help the student.
- Hatcher sued SIU, Chancellor Cheng, and Dean Kempf‑Leonard for Title VII discrimination and retaliation and for §1983 First Amendment retaliation. The district court dismissed the retaliation and First Amendment claims and granted summary judgment for SIU on the sex‑discrimination claim.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the First Amendment claim and the discrimination summary judgment, but reversed dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim for filing an EEOC charge and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether assisting a student in reporting sexual harassment is Title VII protected activity | Hatcher: helping student and criticizing harassment policy is opposition activity under Title VII | SIU: complaint does not allege student was an employee; thus not opposition to an unlawful employment practice | Held: Dismissed — complaint failed to allege protected activity because student’s employee status was not pleaded |
| Whether filing an EEOC charge can support a Title VII retaliation claim | Hatcher: filing EEOC charge (Oct. 3, 2012) and close temporal proximity to final denial supports plausible retaliation claim | SIU: charge filed after dean/provost recommendations; no causation; inadequate pleading that final denial was retaliatory | Held: Reversed dismissal — complaint sufficiently pled protected activity, adverse action, and plausible causation; remanded for discovery |
| Whether Hatcher’s speech about sexual harassment is First Amendment protected | Hatcher: she spoke as a citizen about sexual harassment and policy shortcomings | SIU: speech was pursuant to employment duties (not citizen speech) | Held: Affirmed dismissal — under Garcetti and related precedent, allegations show speech was in her role as faculty (not protected) |
| Whether summary judgment was improper on Title VII sex‑discrimination claim | Hatcher: evidence (comparators, departmental support, cherry‑picked criticisms, rough treatment by dean) creates triable issue/pretext | SIU: legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (insufficient scholarship); no evidence employer was dissembling | Held: Affirmed summary judgment — plaintiff failed to show SIU’s stated reason was unworthy of belief or produce sufficient direct/circumstantial evidence of discrimination |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must be plausible, not merely conceivable)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (Title VII pleading not subject to heightened standard)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (public‑employee speech pursuant to duties is not First Amendment protected)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (Title VII retaliation requires protected activity and materially adverse action)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (standard for public‑employee speech analysis)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819 (pleading requirement to identify protected activity in retaliation claims)
- Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931 (need specific facts to plausibly show speech was not pursuant to employment)
- McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 705 F.3d 751 (practical approach to whether speech is pursuant to duties)