Hassey v. City of Columbus, 111 N.E.3d 1253

Background

James Hassey, a Columbus police officer employed 2002–2014, admitted in internal affairs interview to regularly using marijuana for years and sharing it with an ex-girlfriend; he declined voluntary drug testing.
Division charged Hassey with violations of Rules 1.36 (unbecoming conduct) and 1.42(C) (illegal drugs); chief recommended termination and director of public safety terminated him effective June 11, 2014.
Hassey appealed to the Columbus Civil Service Commission, which upheld the termination; he then appealed to Franklin County Court of Common Pleas under R.C. 2506.01; the trial court affirmed.
Hassey argued (1) the CBA Section 17.9 (first-time positive drug test protections) limited discipline to a ≤24-hour suspension and therefore applied to him, (2) disparate treatment compared to four other officers who received suspensions, and (3) an equal protection ("class-of-one") violation.
The trial court held it lacked jurisdiction to enforce Section 17.9 because the CBA provided final and binding arbitration; the court of appeals found the trial court erred on jurisdiction but that Section 17.9 did not apply on its merits and affirmed the termination.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jurisdiction / exclusive grievance remedy (Assignments 1 & 4)	Hassey: CBA §17.9 and arbitration not exclusive; trial court erred in refusing to apply §17.9	City: R.C. 4117.10(A) makes grievance/arbitration exclusive; trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce §17.9	Court: CBA expressly preserved charter-based appeals; Commission and trial court had jurisdiction to hear §17.9 claims, so trial court erred to say it lacked jurisdiction, but outcome still affirmed on other grounds
Applicability of CBA §17.9 (discipline cap for first-time positives)	Hassey: §17.9 protections should apply by analogy to his admission of use (even absent a positive test)	City: §17.9 by its plain terms applies only to officers who test positive for a prohibited substance	Held: §17.9 applies only to first-time positive drug tests; Hassey never tested positive, so §17.9 does not apply to him
Comparative discipline (Assignment 2)	Hassey: Discipline was disparate—four officers with drug/alcohol misconduct received suspensions, not termination	City: Those officers’ misconduct differed materially in frequency, nature, and seriousness	Held: Differences (repeated long-term use and supplying marijuana) made the officers not similarly situated; no improper disparate discipline
Equal protection / class-of-one (Assignment 3)	Hassey: Treated differently without rational basis compared to officers disciplined under §17.9	City: Theory waived and class-of-one inapplicable in public employment	Held: Argument waived and class-of-one claim unavailable in public employment; claim fails

Key Cases Cited

Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive, 142 Ohio St.3d 125 (2014) (standard of appellate review in R.C. 2506 administrative appeals)
Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 318 (2014) (deference to trial court factfinding in administrative appeals)
Cincinnati v. Ohio Council 8, Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, 61 Ohio St.3d 658 (1991) (R.C. Chapter 4117 preempts home-rule charter provisions)
Streetsboro Edn. Assn. v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 68 Ohio St.3d 288 (1994) (relationship between collective bargaining agreement provisions and law under R.C. 4117.10)
State ex rel. Kabert v. Shaker Heights City School Bd. of Edn., 78 Ohio St.3d 37 (1997) (contract interpretation principles guide CBA construction)
In re Civil Serv. Charges Against Piper, 142 Ohio App.3d 765 (2001) (civil service commission retains jurisdiction to interpret labor contract issues when employee invokes administrative appeal)
Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (class-of-one equal protection theory not applicable in public-employment context)