Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526

Innsbrook residents sued Town of Merrillville, Town Defendants, and Warmelink under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging equal protection violations and later asserted state-law claims.
District court granted summary judgment for the Town and Town Defendants on the § 1983 claim for lack of a similarly situated comparator.
Warmelink separately moved for summary judgment; the district court sua sponte granted him summary judgment on the § 1983 claim under Rule 60(a).
Residents filed a timely notice of appeal naming the Town, Town Defendants, and Warmelink but not the December 3 order; later, a separate Rule 58 judgment in favor of Warmelink was issued.
Warmelink argued appellate jurisdiction was improper due to the notice of appeal; the Seventh Circuit held jurisdiction existed since the February 15 judgment named him and the notice apprised him of the issues.
The court noted briefing deficiencies but declined to strike the residents’ brief; it found First Amendment claims waived due to lack of authority and development.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Warmelink is within appellate jurisdiction	Residents contend Rule 3(c) designation was sufficient to appeal.	Warmelink argues lack of notice precludes jurisdiction.	Jurisdiction over Warmelink affirmed; notice apprised him of issues.
Whether the First Amendment claim was properly preserved and argued	Residents preserved a free-speech claim in the complaint and briefing.	No developed First Amendment argument with supporting authorities.	Waived; no adequate development or authority cited.
Whether the § 1983 equal protection claim survives summary judgment	Residents showed they were similarly situated to a white comparator and treated differently.	No admissible evidence shows Innsbrook residents are similarly situated to Southmoor residents; cannot prove disparate treatment.	Summary judgment upheld; no similarly situated comparator identified.
Whether the district court correctly remanded state-law claims	State claims should remain pending or be dismissed with prejudice.	Remand to state court was appropriate after federal claims dismissed.	Modified: dismiss state-law claims without prejudice rather than remand.

United States v. Dowell, 257 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2001) (intent to appeal may be inferred from notice if appellee not prejudiced)
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1992) (jurisdictional Rule 3(c) designation is technically jurisdictional)
Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atl. Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (inept attempts to comply with Rule 3(c) tolerated if not prejudicial)
United States v. Segal, 432 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2005) (notice sufficiency depends on whether appellee was misled)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard requires evidence on which a reasonable jury could rely)
LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill. of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (similarly situated analysis requires very similar comparators)
McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2004) (similarity standard in equal protection analysis)
Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371 (7th Cir. 2008) (district court may grant summary judgment to non-moving defendants where appropriate)
Mosley v. City of Chi., 614 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2010) (summary judgment standard; nonmoving party must provide specific facts)
United States v. Useni, 516 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2008) (perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived)