Harvey v. Dept. of Correction
SC20325
| Conn. | Jul 27, 2021Background
- The decedent submitted a certificate of good faith to the Claims Commissioner and was granted permission to sue the state for medical malpractice under Gen. Stat. § 4-160(b).
- The decedent died of the alleged malpractice before filing suit; Sandra Harvey was appointed administratrix of his estate and filed a wrongful death action premised on the same medical negligence.
- The certified question presented whether the administratrix must comply with both the limitations period in § 4-160(d) (claims against the state) and Gen. Stat. § 52-555 (wrongful death) to maintain the wrongful death suit.
- The majority held that she must comply with both statutes of limitations and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because she did not. The concurrence joins that result.
- The concurrence raises separate, unresolved jurisdictional questions: whether § 4-160(b) — which mandates that the Claims Commissioner authorize suit when a certificate of good faith is filed — covers wrongful death claims premised on medical malpractice, and whether an administratrix must return to the Claims Commissioner for fresh authorization after the original claimant dies.
- Connecticut case law and § 4-160(b)’s text do not clearly answer whether (a) a wrongful death claim is a claim "alleging malpractice" within § 4-160(b) and (b) a grant of permission to sue for malpractice necessarily encompasses a wrongful death claim based on that malpractice; the concurrence urges legislative clarification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether administratrix must comply with both § 4-160(d) and § 52-555 limitations to bring wrongful death suit after claimant obtained § 4-160(b) permission before death | Harvey: must comply with both but her filing was timely under applicable rules | State: Harvey failed to comply with required limitations; suit barred | Court: Yes—both limitations apply; suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (administratrix did not comply) |
| Whether § 4-160(b) covers wrongful death claims premised on medical malpractice (i.e., does permission for malpractice include wrongful death) | Harvey: permission to sue for malpractice encompasses wrongful death based on same underlying negligence | State: wrongful death is distinct; prior permission may not authorize wrongful death; fresh permission could be required | Court: Not decided by majority; concurrence identifies as unresolved and calls for legislative clarification |
| Whether a claim that becomes more particularized (or adopts a different theory) is covered by the Claims Commissioner’s prior authorization under § 4-160(b) | Harvey: authorization for malpractice should cover more particularized theories developed later | State: materially different theories not authorized by prior permission | Held in Arroyo (appellate precedent): more particularized theories that are not materially different may be covered; materially different claims are not covered |
| Whether filing a certificate of good faith removes the Claims Commissioner’s discretion to deny permission to sue | Harvey: certificate of good faith mandates authorization under § 4-160(b) | State: (challenged in other contexts) Commissioner may retain discretion absent certificate | Court (D’Eramo precedent): certificate of good faith converts § 4‑160(b) into a mandatory authorization—Commissioner loses discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610 (Conn. 2005) (holding § 4-160(b) removes Claims Commissioner’s discretion when a certificate of good faith is filed)
- Arroyo v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 175 Conn. App. 493 (Conn. App. 2017) (permitted more particularized trial theory where underlying theory remained the same; materially different claims not authorized)
- Foran v. Carangelo, 153 Conn. 356 (Conn. 1966) (wrongful death action is a continuance of the decedent’s claim)
- Morneau v. State, 150 Conn. App. 237 (Conn. App. 2014) (claimant must provide sufficient notice to the Claims Commissioner; plaintiff limited to theories raised before the commissioner)
- Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 (Conn. 2002) (public policy and method choices are for the legislature; courts defer to legislative policy choices)