Harty v. West Point Realty, Inc.
28 F.4th 435
| 2d Cir. | 2022Background:
- Plaintiff Owen Harty, a wheelchair user and self-described ADA "tester," visited West Point Realty’s hotel booking website to evaluate compliance with 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e) (requirements to identify accessible features).
- Harty did not allege he visited the site to arrange travel or that he had concrete plans to stay at the hotel; he alleged only that the website lacked required accessibility information.
- West Point Realty moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for want of Article III standing) and 12(b)(6).
- Harty submitted an affidavit with his opposition; the district court treated the defendant’s challenge as a facial 12(b)(1) attack and declined to consider the affidavit, dismissing the complaint for lack of standing.
- On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed (1) whether the district court properly declined to consider the affidavit, (2) whether Harty alleged a concrete injury in fact, and (3) whether the dismissal was with prejudice.
- The Second Circuit affirmed: the district court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding the affidavit, Harty lacked Article III standing, and the dismissal was without prejudice.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court erred by excluding Harty’s affidavit on a 12(b)(1) facial challenge | Harty argued the affidavit supplied jurisdictional facts supporting standing | West Point argued its motion was a facial challenge and the court may decide based on the complaint alone | Court: No abuse of discretion; affidavit merely supplemented (did not contradict) complaint and defendant mounted a facial, not factual, challenge, so court could decide on the pleadings |
| Whether Harty alleged a concrete injury in fact (standing) | Harty claimed informational injury and discrimination from the website’s noncompliance; he also asserted future intent to revisit/use the site and relied on tester status | West Point argued Harty alleged only a bare procedural violation without concrete, particularized harm or imminent intent to use the site | Court: No standing. Harty alleged no concrete, particularized injury (no intent to travel, no downstream use of withheld information, labels/conclusions insufficient) |
| Whether dismissal was with prejudice | Harty contended dismissal effectively barred refiling | West Point maintained dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice | Court: Dismissal was without prejudice; district court permissibly denied leave to amend but lacked power to enter a merits dismissal with prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing elements and imminence requirement)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (concrete and particularized injury requirement)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. _, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (statutory violation alone insufficient for damages standing; distinguishes risks relevant to injunctive relief)
- Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2016) (facial vs. factual 12(b)(1) challenges)
- Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2014) (district court must consider extrinsic evidence when jurisdictional facts are in dispute)
- Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2000) (courts may refer to evidence outside the pleadings on 12(b)(1) motions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (labels and conclusions insufficient to survive dismissal)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (testers can have standing when they allege specific injury)
- Fac. v. New York Univ., 11 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2021) (dismissal for lack of Article III standing must be without prejudice)