368 N.C. 122
N.C.2015Background
- Challenge to constitutionality of Opportunity Scholarship Program (voucher) under North Carolina Constitution.
- Program provides scholarships up to $4,200 to lower-income students to attend private nonpublic schools.
- Funding sourced from general revenues via UNC Board of Governors to support the Authority; FY2014-15 appropriation was $10.8 million.
- Trial court ruled program unconstitutional; the court of appeals reversed and upheld constitutionality.
- Court reviews facial challenges de novo, applying presumption of validity and requiring clear unconstitutionality; program’s statutory framework includes recipient eligibility, school requirements, and reporting obligations.
- Program implants accountability provisions through school- and student-focused requirements, but the majority finds these standards insufficient to invalidate the program on public-purpose grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Art. IX, Sec. 6 prohibits funding nonpublic scholarships | Hart contends Art. IX, Sec. 6 requires exclusive funding of public schools. | Defendants argue Sec. 6 funds public education fund but does not bar general-revenue funding for other educational initiatives. | Not prohibited; general-revenue funding for nonpublic scholarships permissible. |
| Whether Art. IX, Sec. 2(1) bars an alternate private educational system | Scholars argue program creates a nonuniform/private system not authorized by Art. IX, Sec. 2(1). | Uniformity applies to public schools; program does not create an alternate public/private system. | Does not violate uniformity clause; public funds may support initiatives outside the public system. |
| Whether funding is for a public purpose under Art. V, Sec. 2(1) and 2(7) | Funding private-school scholarships cannot qualify as public purpose. | Program serves broad public benefits by expanding educational opportunities. | Funding is for a public purpose; appropriation upheld. |
| Independent applicability of Art. I, Sec. 15 and Art. I, Sec. 19 | Art. I, Sec. 15 guarantees right to education; Sec. 19 prohibits discrimination. | These provisions do not independently invalidate the program; public purpose analysis controls; standing issues on Sec. 19. | Art. I, Sec. 15 is not independently controlling; Sec. 19 standing dismissed; program sustained on public-purpose grounds. |
| Standing to challenge religious discrimination claim under Art. I, Sec. 19 | Taxpayers can challenge discriminatory impact. | Taxpayers lack standing because they are not in the protected class; eligible students would have standing. | Dismissed for lack of taxpayer standing. |
Key Cases Cited
- State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1970) (public-education purpose；education as state objective)
- Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) (right to sound basic public education; interplay with Art. IX, §2)
- Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634, 386 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. 1989) (two-part public-purpose test; ends and means)
- Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 363 N.C. 500, 681 S.E.2d 278 (N.C. 2009) (facial challenges; high bar; public-purpose framework)
- Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996) (public purpose inquiry; private benefit allowed if public goal predominant)
- In re Hous. Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 296 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 1982) (guidance on constitutional review and factual presumptions)