Hart v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., 2:12-cv-00733

Plaintiff Jamie Hart, an NCO employee, was shot by his ex‑fiancée in NCO’s private employee parking lot as he arrived for work, losing an eye and incurring substantial medical expenses.
The shooter was not an NCO employee; she pleaded guilty to felonious assault and is incarcerated.
NCO leased the building and controlled the adjacent private parking lot reserved for employees; Hart parked in an employee spot and was walking to the employee entrance when shot.
Hart notified supervisors about prior threats and incidents; NCO told him to contact police but took no further action.
The Ohio BWC denied Hart’s workers’ compensation claim as not "in the course of and arising out of employment." Hart sued NCO for negligence, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court considered cross‑motions for summary judgment on whether O.R.C. § 4123.74 grants NCO immunity from Hart’s tort claims; the court granted immunity for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress but allowed the intentional tort claim to proceed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hart suffered an "injury" within workers' comp meaning	"Accidental" language excludes deliberate assaults	The statute covers "any injury," including intentional assaults	Injury qualifies under statute; deliberate conduct does not exclude coverage
Whether employer immunity requires both "in the course of" AND "arising out of" employment	Immunity requires satisfying both prongs	Immunity is disjunctive; satisfying one prong suffices	Immunity is disjunctive; one prong satisfied is enough
Preclusive effect of BWC denial on immunity determination	BWC decision precludes relitigation (issue/claim preclusion)	BWC decision on conjunctive compensability is not identical to disjunctive immunity inquiry	BWC denial is not preclusive for immunity; different legal standard and statute contemplates separate inquiry
Application of prongs to facts (time/place/circumstance and causal relation)	Injury was personal/domestic; not work‑related so no immunity	Injury occurred on employer‑controlled premises while reporting to work, so "in the course of" employment	As matter of law injury occurred "in the course of" employment (employer premises, arriving for work); but injury did not "arise out of" employment (origin was a personal dispute). Immunity granted on "in the course of" ground.

Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 689 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1998) (defines "in the course of employment" and scope of activity related to employment)
MTD Products, Inc. v. Robatin, 61 Ohio St.3d 66, 572 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio 1991) (coming‑and‑going rule and its rationale)
Marlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St.2d 18, 225 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 1967) ("zone of employment"/employer control of parking lot can render injuries within course of employment)
Delassandro v. Industrial Comm., 110 Ohio St. 506, 144 N.E. 138 (Ohio 1924) (assault arising from work‑related conduct can make injury compensable)
Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 927 N.E.2d 1066 (Ohio 2010) (distinguishing employer immunity from liability for intentional torts)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standard)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard)