Harstad v. Whiteman, 338 S.W.3d 804

Michael Harstad was a tenured professor at Asbury College, subject to a faculty manual outlining termination standards for inappropriate conduct including perceived dating relationships with students.
In 2003–2004, students reported concerns about Harstad's closeness with Reichmuth, including access to tutoring, class residency, and other off-campus activities.
Whiteman, Asbury's Provost, sent a November 2004 letter emphasizing the appearance of improper behavior and the potential for termination, while noting no actual termination at that time.
Harstad and Thacker met in November 2004; Harstad refused to identify accusers and threatened retaliation; the college deferred to formal processes and witnesses were not disclosed.
Harstad was terminated in February 2005 following investigations; he appealed through the faculty process, which produced a indecisive report but ultimately the President upheld termination.
Harstad filed separate lawsuits: defamation and tortious interference against Whiteman, Thacker, and Lowe, and a breach-of-contract claim against Asbury; summary judgments disposed of the defamation/interference claims, while the contract claim went to trial and favored Asbury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defamation claims were protected by qualified privilege	Harstad argues statements were false and malice, not privileged.	Defendants claim statements were made in the course of employment duties with qualified privilege.	Yes; statements were privileged and not shown to be abusively malice-bearing.
Whether the defamation privilege was abused or waived	Harstad asserts knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.	Defendants contend no evidence of abuse or malice.	No genuine issue of material fact; no abuse or malice shown.
Whether tortious interference with contract was properly dismissed	Harstad contends college employees interfered improperly with his contract.	Whiteman/Thacker/Lowe are not third parties; they acted within employment scope with no malice.	Affirmed; no third-party interference and no malice shown.
Whether evidence of disparate treatment should have been admitted	Harstad argues disparate treatment was relevant to good faith.	Evidence of other contracts is irrelevant to this breach of contract claim.	Excluded; not relevant to the contract breach claim and untouched by error.
Whether the jury instructions were proper	Harstad sought additional instructions on termination procedures and lies/gossip policy.	Bare-bones instruction adequately framed the sole issue of breach for cause.	Proper; no reversible error; instructions complied with Kentucky law.

Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. App. 1981) (elements of defamation; qualified privilege analysis)
Cargill v. Greater Salem Baptist Church, 215 S.W.3d 63 (Ky. App. 2006) (abuse of qualified privilege requires evidence of knowing falsity or reckless disregard)
Landrum v. Braun, 978 S.W.2d 756 (Ky. App. 1998) (qualified privilege context in employment communications)
Biber v. Duplicator Sales & Service, Inc., 155 S.W.3d 732 (Ky. App. 2004) (intra-corporate immunity versus qualified privilege distinction)
Stewart v. Williams, 218 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. 1949) (malice required after privilege attaches)
Ball v. E.W. Scripps Co., 801 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1990) (reckless disregard standard for malice in defamation)
Heshelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. App. 1990) (preservation of evidentiary objections; CR 59.06 context)
Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2005) (bare bones jury instructions; deference to counsel)
Rogers v. Kasdan, 612 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1981) (bare bones instruction principle)
Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1965) (definition and permissible scope of privileged communications)
Carmichael-Lynch-Nolan Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Bennett & Associates, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. App. 1977) (Restatement standard for interference; third-party requirement)