Harry Smith v. Secretary of Labor
659 F. App'x 296
6th Cir.2016Background
- Harry Smith, a truck driver for Lake City Enterprises, was terminated after reporting unsafe equipment/conditions and stating he would have the trailer inspected by DOT; he filed an STAA whistleblower complaint.
- OSHA/ALJ found Lake City and its president Crystle Morgan violated 49 U.S.C. § 31105; the ALJ and Board found Donald Morgan (Crystle’s husband) not individually liable.
- Donald worked at Lake City as an independent owner-operator, maintained his truck on the premises, advised Crystle occasionally, but had no managerial title, ownership stake, hiring/firing authority, or direct control over Smith’s employment.
- After final agency proceedings, the Board awarded Smith $7,280 in attorney fees and $440.13 expenses (later adjusted to $8,056.13); Smith sought additional fees and sought clarification about fees for appellate/bankruptcy work.
- Smith discovered third-party testimony suggesting Donald was viewed as a co-owner, moved to reopen the agency record, and filed timely petitions for review challenging (1) Donald’s non-liability, (2) the fee award, and (3) denial of the motion to reopen.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Donald Morgan is liable under the STAA as a joint employer | Donald exercised central control / joint-owner role at Lake City and thus influenced employment decisions | Donald had only a tenuous involvement; no control over hiring, firing, or terms of Smith’s employment | Affirms non-liability: substantial evidence shows Donald lacked control over Smith’s employment; not a joint employer |
| Timeliness of Smith’s petition for review of the November 2012 Board order | 60-day review period triggered later (e.g., fee order) or should be tolled; thus petition was timely | Final order issued Nov. 20, 2012, making Smith’s Nov. 12, 2013 petition untimely | Court assumes timeliness for merits but holds even if timely the non-liability determination is supported by substantial evidence |
| Adequacy and scope of attorney’s fee award | Award was inadequate; sought fees for Board, Sixth Circuit, bankruptcy work and additional time through Jan 2013 | Board/ALJ limited award to certain periods and sought clarification on supplemental fee claims | Dismisses review of the Sept. 12, 2013 fee order as non-final; preserves Smith’s right to seek review after a final Board order |
| Denial of motion to reopen record based on newly discovered testimony | New testimony shows Donald was viewed as co-owner; should reopen record and reconsider liability | Motion filed while appeal pending; Board lacked jurisdiction and even on merits reopening unlikely | Denies review: Board properly refused to consider the motion during pending appeal and concluded reopening likely would be denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Moon v. Transp. Drivers, Inc., 836 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1987) (standard for substantial evidence review)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1971) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Reich, 27 F.3d 1133 (6th Cir. 1994) (deference to agency legal conclusions and interpretations)
