Harry Jerome Evans v. State of Minnesota, 868 N.W.2d 227

Background

Harry Jerome Evans was convicted of first-degree murder of a peace officer for the 2005 killing of Sgt. Gerald Vick and sentenced to life without release.
On direct appeal, this court remanded for a Schwartz hearing to investigate a juror-bias allegation after a third-party call; subpoenas issued included cover-letter language (agreed by Evans’s counsel) permitting prehearing contact with witnesses.
At the Schwartz hearing the State had previously interviewed the allegedly biased juror; the district court found no prejudice and denied Evans’s motion to exclude that testimony.
This court affirmed the conviction, holding the invited-error doctrine barred relief based on counsel’s agreement to the subpoena language and that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous (State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 2008)).
Evans’s first postconviction petition was denied and affirmed by this court (Evans v. State, 788 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 2010)); he later filed a Rule 60.02 motion in May 2014 alleging ineffective assistance (trial and appellate), prosecutorial misconduct, and denial of a fair trial.
The district court treated the Rule 60.02 filing as a second postconviction petition and denied relief as untimely under Minn. Stat. ch. 590 and untimely under Rule 60.02; the Supreme Court affirmed on timeliness grounds.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Evans’s Rule 60.02 motion was timely	Evans argued the motion sought relief from judgment and was filed within a reasonable time	State argued the motion was filed over five years after direct appeal and was not within a reasonable time under Rule 60.02	Court held the Rule 60.02 motion was untimely (not filed within a reasonable time)
Whether the claims were timely under the postconviction statute (Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4)	Evans argued his claims (including ineffective assistance) should proceed despite delay	State argued the two-year statutory limit after direct-appeal disposition bars the petition and no statutory exceptions apply	Court held all claims untimely under the two-year postconviction statute and no exceptions applied
Whether district court erred in construing the filing as a second postconviction petition	Evans contended the filing was a Rule 60.02 motion, not a second postconviction petition	State maintained postconviction statute is the exclusive remedy and the district court properly treated the filing as a successive petition	Court declined to decide the classification but affirmed denial because claims were untimely under either Rule 60.02 or the postconviction statute
Applicability of Trevino/Martinez to revive ineffective-assistance claims	Evans argued Trevino and Martinez are retroactively applicable to excuse procedural bars	State argued those U.S. Supreme Court cases concern federal habeas procedural-default doctrine and do not apply to state postconviction timing rules	Court held Trevino and Martinez inapplicable to state postconviction proceedings; they do not revive Evans’s claims

Key Cases Cited

State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 2008) (direct-appeal opinion remanding for Schwartz hearing and affirming conviction)
Evans v. State, 788 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 2010) (affirming denial of first postconviction petition and applying Knaffla bar)
State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976) (claims known at time of direct appeal must be raised then or are procedurally barred)
Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1960) (procedure for posttrial investigative hearing into juror misconduct)
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (federal habeas procedural-default decision; not applicable to state postconviction timing)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (federal habeas ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-counsel exception; not applicable to state postconviction timing)