948 F.3d 1318
11th Cir.2020Background
- Harrius Johnson, a Miami‑Dade Police sergeant, sued the County alleging racial discrimination and retaliation after multiple complaints and EEOC filings; District Court granted summary judgment for the County.
- In 2013 Johnson reported supervisor Ricelli’s conduct; Ricelli then gave low monthly evaluations, denied leave (argument later waived), issued a Record of Counseling (ROC) and a Disciplinary Action Report (DAR) with a five‑day suspension.
- In April 2015 Johnson filed two EEOC charges. In June 2015 Captain White sought that Johnson alter a DAR; Johnson refused and received a DAR and five‑day suspension for insubordination.
- In August 2015 disputed interactions with White led to a recommended 20‑day suspension; Police Director Patterson instead terminated Johnson (decision upheld after an appeal meeting in Jan. 2016).
- The District Court ruled Johnson failed to show the County’s nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual (no valid comparators and insufficient pretext evidence); Eleventh Circuit vacated the comparator‑analysis portion for reconsideration under Lewis v. City of Union City but affirmed summary judgment on the 2013, June 2015, and termination claims and upheld denial of a mayoral deposition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Comparator‑evidence standard for proving pretext | Lewis requires a more flexible “similarly situated in all material respects” test that could make Johnson’s comparators valid | District Court applied pre‑Lewis, stricter nearly‑identical test | Vacated portion of judgment and remanded for reconsideration under Lewis |
| 2013 actions by Lt. Ricelli (low evaluations, leave denial, ROC/DAR) | Ricelli retaliated for Johnson’s reports of misconduct | Discipline was for insubordination and circumventing chain of command; leave claim waived on appeal | Affirmed SJ: negative evaluations not materially adverse; leave claim forfeited; ROC/DAR legitimate and not shown to be pretextual |
| June 2015 DAR/suspension by Capt. White | Suspension was retaliation for April EEOC filings | Suspension was for insubordination in meeting with White | Affirmed SJ: temporal gap (~58 days) and lack of other pretext evidence insufficient to show retaliation |
| August 2015 DAR and termination by Dir. Patterson (including "cat’s paw" theory) | White falsified report out of retaliation; Patterson relied on White and terminated Johnson | Patterson independently reviewed both versions and exercised discretion to terminate for non‑retaliatory reasons | Affirmed SJ: no evidence Patterson acted with retaliatory animus; cat’s paw fails because Patterson conducted independent review |
| Deposing the Miami‑Dade mayor for §1983/Monell liability | Deposing Mayor Gimenez was necessary to show ratification or policymaker knowledge | Johnson did not plead ratification; widespread‑practice theory does not require the mayor’s deposition | Affirmed denial of deposition: ratification claim not pled and mayor’s testimony unnecessary to prove a widespread practice |
Key Cases Cited
- Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (adopts comparator test: "similarly situated in all material respects")
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for circumstantial Title VII claims)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (standard for materially adverse actions in retaliation claims)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability for constitutional violations via policy/custom)
- Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (cat’s paw liability theory)
- Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) (decisionmaker must have relied on biased recommendation without independent investigation for cat’s paw liability)
- Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006) (temporal proximity can support causation but is not dispositive)
- Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007) (three‑to‑four month gap insufficient by temporal proximity alone)
- Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018) (requiring very close temporal proximity without more to infer causation)
- Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1991) (widespread practice or custom can establish municipal liability)