HARRISON v. McAFEE Et Al.
338 Ga. App. 393
Ga. Ct. App.2016Background
- On June 16, 2011 John Harrison was shot in the arm at the Shamrock bar; the shooter was never arrested or prosecuted.
- Harrison sued Dargan McAfee (alleged owner) and later added Twisted Shamrock, Inc., for negligent premises maintenance on August 14, 2013.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting the two-year personal-injury statute of limitations (OCGA § 9-3-33) barred the suit.
- Harrison amended to plead tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99 (Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005), and alternatively raised OCGA § 9-3-94 based on administrative dissolution of the corporate defendant.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, rejecting tolling under §§ 9-3-99 and 9-3-94; Harrison appealed, urging this Court to overrule prior Georgia Court of Appeals precedent that limited § 9-3-99 to suits against alleged perpetrators.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA § 9-3-99 tolls the statute of limitations for any tort action brought by a crime victim, regardless of whether the defendant has been accused/prosecuted | § 9-3-99 tolled Harrison’s claim because he is a crime victim and his tort claim arose out of the crime | Prior Court of Appeals precedent limits § 9-3-99 tolling to suits against persons accused/prosecuted for the underlying crime | § 9-3-99 applies to “any cause of action in tort” brought by a crime victim that arises out of the crime; prior cases (Valades, Branton, Mays, Orr) were overruled to the extent they limited the statute’s scope |
| Whether stare decisis requires adherence to prior Court of Appeals decisions construing § 9-3-99 | Harrison argued prior interpretations were incorrect and should be overruled | Defendants urged reliance on existing precedent construing the statute narrowly | Court overruled prior, relatively recent precedent because the plain text compelled a broader reading and reliance interests were minimal |
| Whether court must resolve Harrison’s alternate tolling claim under OCGA § 9-3-94 (entity absent from state) | Twisted Shamrock’s administrative dissolution rendered it effectively absent, tolling limitations as to that defendant | Defendants opposed tolling under § 9-3-94 | Court did not reach § 9-3-94 because ruling on § 9-3-99 made it unnecessary |
Key Cases Cited
- DeKalb Med. Ctr. v. Hawkins, 288 Ga. App. 840 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (prior dicta suggesting tolling tied to pending prosecution)
- Valades v. Uslu, 301 Ga. App. 885 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (held § 9-3-99 did not toll suit where defendant was not prosecuted)
- Columbia County v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (applied Valades to ante litem notice; limited statute)
- Mays v. Target Corp., 322 Ga. App. 44 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (found ambiguity but construed § 9-3-99 as limited to suits against accused)
- Orr v. River Edge Cmty. Serv. Bd., 331 Ga. App. 228 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (reaffirmed limiting construction to criminal defendants)
- Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733 (Supreme Court of Ga.) (construed the term “crime” in § 9-3-99)