139 S. Ct. 2606
SCOTUS2019Background
- In 2016 Alabama enacted a statute banning "dismemberment" abortions—procedures that intentionally dismember a living unborn child using clamps, forceps, scissors, or similar instruments.
- The law does not ban all abortions but prohibits the specified method described in Ala. Code §26–23G–3(a) and §26–23G–2(3).
- Abortion providers challenged the statute, arguing alternative methods posed greater risks or were impracticable, and sought relief in federal court.
- The district court (and the Eleventh Circuit) found contested medical evidence sufficient to conclude the law placed a substantial obstacle—an "undue burden"—on previability abortions and enjoined enforcement.
- The State petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari; the Court denied review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alabama may prohibit "dismemberment" abortion methods pre-viability | Ban places a substantial obstacle by eliminating the most common second-trimester method and forcing riskier alternatives | States may regulate or ban particular abortion methods; the Constitution does not compel allowance of gruesome methods | Certiorari denied; lower-court injunction remained in place (no Supreme Court reversal) |
| Whether contested medical evidence about risks of alternatives defeats the statute | Medical testimony shows alternatives are riskier or impracticable, so the ban effectively burdens access | Medical disagreement does not foreclose States from legislating on abortion methods designed to prevent brutal practices | Supreme Court declined to review the factual/constitutional balancing made by lower courts |
| Whether the "undue burden" standard permits upholding method-specific bans | Plaintiffs: undue-burden protects right to chosen methods if alternatives impose substantial obstacle | State: undue-burden doctrine should allow regulation of methods especially when moral/reasoned concerns exist | The Court denied certiorari, leaving the undue-burden analysis of lower courts intact; concurrence criticized the doctrine but did not change disposition |
| Whether this case provides vehicle to revisit or overrule undue-burden framework | Plaintiffs: case shows undue-burden protects previability abortion broadly | State: case suitable to revisit precedent and restore greater deference to state regulation | Supreme Court did not take the case; Justice Thomas concurred urging reconsideration but no majority action |
Key Cases Cited
- Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. _ (2016) (reaffirming undue-burden standard for abortion regulations)
- Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality) (formulation of the undue-burden test)
- Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding partial-birth abortion ban; cited regarding limits on method-specific bans)
- Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (decision and related dissent addressing method-specific abortion bans)
- West Alabama Women's Center v. Williamson, 900 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2018) (describing dismemberment procedures and applying undue-burden analysis)
- Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., 587 U.S. _ (2019) (cited in concurrence regarding abortion jurisprudence drift)