Harris v. State
309 Ga. 599
| Ga. | 2020Background
- On Sept. 7, 2012, six men were accosted in a carport and fired upon; Kenneth Roberts died of multiple gunshot wounds. Robert Harris was indicted jointly with Marcus Battle and Jacobey Carter.
- Evidence linked Harris to the scene: eyewitness accounts, blood trail from driveway matching Harris, Harris’s blood in a white car driven by Adrieonna Jumper, and Battle’s phone records near the scene.
- Nathaniel Howard testified that robbery was the motive and identified Harris and co-defendants; at trial he was in federal custody and testified he hoped for a federal sentence reduction but denied any State deal.
- A detective testified (as a lay-witness opinion under Rule 701) that Harris likely shot himself in the leg while fleeing. Trial counsel did not object to that testimony.
- Harris was convicted (malice murder and multiple related counts) at a Sept. 2014 jury trial and sentenced to life without parole for malice murder plus concurrent terms; Harris challenged trial counsel, post-trial counsel, the denial of a continuance, and sentencing merger.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed all rulings except it vacated the aggravated-assault conviction on Count 5 because it merged with the aggravated-battery conviction based on the same conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Harris' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to detective’s opinion that Harris shot himself | Trial counsel should have objected because the detective lacked specialized expertise to opine that Harris self-inflicted the wound | The opinion was a permissible lay inference under OCGA § 24-7-701(a); counsel’s failure to object to a meritless claim is not ineffective assistance | Court: No ineffective assistance; the detective’s opinion was admissible under Rule 701 and objection would have been meritless |
| 2) Motion-for-new-trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise Brady re: Howard’s alleged federal sentence reduction | Counsel should have raised that the State suppressed evidence that Howard had already received a sentence reduction, which would impeach his credibility | Even if a deal existed, Howard had disclosed hope for a reduction and his pretrial statements matched trial testimony; Harris cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome | Court: No prejudice under Brady; counsel not ineffective because Harris cannot prove materiality/prejudice |
| 3) Due-process (Giglio/Napue) claim that State knowingly used false testimony about no deal | Howard’s testimony that there was no deal was false and the State knew it, so conviction rests partly on false evidence | Howard never expressly denied a federal deal; jury knew his motivation and testimony matched prior statements; no reasonable likelihood the verdict was affected | Court: Claim fails for lack of materiality; no reasonable likelihood falsehood affected verdict |
| 4) Trial court abused discretion by denying motion for continuance | New counsel was unprepared; denial deprived Harris of time to investigate (e.g., impeach Howard, hire expert on wound, show left-handedness) | Trial date had been specially set after prior counsel withdrawal; court offered additional time during trial and Harris showed no harm from denial | Court: Even if discretionary error, Harris failed to show harm from denial; claim fails |
| 5) Sentencing: whether aggravated assault (Count 5) should merge with aggravated battery (Count 10) | Count 5 punished same conduct (shooting Finch) as Count 10 and thus should merge | State contended separate convictions were appropriate | Court: Aggravated assault merged into aggravated battery; conviction and sentence on Count 5 vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (legal-sufficiency standard for convictions)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective-assistance test)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution duty to disclose favorable evidence)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (prosecutor’s use of witness testimony affected by plea/deal)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (due-process violation where State uses false testimony)
- United States v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135 (materiality standard for Giglio/Napue claims)
- Bullard v. State, 307 Ga. 482 (Rule 701 permits lay opinions informed by professional experience)
- Thornton v. State, 307 Ga. 121 (detective lay-opinion admissible under Rule 701)
- DeLoach v. State, 308 Ga. 283 (prosecutor’s knowing use of false evidence violates due process)
- Battle v. State, 301 Ga. 694 (companion appeal setting out core factual findings)
- Milner v. State, 281 Ga. 612 (Brady prejudice/materiality discussion)
- Wofford v. State, 305 Ga. 694 (merger of aggravated-assault into aggravated-battery for same conduct)
- Douglas v. State, 303 Ga. 178 (multiple wounds in single uninterrupted act do not support multiple charges)
- Regent v. State, 299 Ga. 172 (merger principles where injuries arise from same act)
- Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648 (defendant must show harm from denial of continuance)
- Phoenix v. State, 304 Ga. 785 (prejudice requirement where denial of continuance prevented expert testimony)
- Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281 (must show what additional evidence would have been presented to establish harm)