Harris v. Quinn
134 S. Ct. 2618
| SCOTUS | 2014Background
- Medicaid Home Services Program in Illinois funds in-home care via personal assistants (PAs) who are hired by and work under the private customers who receive care; the customer is the PA’s employer, while the State pays the PA’s salary.
- Illinois designates SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as the exclusive representative for Rehabilitation Program PAs and includes an agency-fee (fair-share) provision deducted from PA wages.
- The State’s involvement is limited to funding and basic oversight; customers control most day-to-day employment aspects (hiring, firing, supervision, service plans).
- In 2003–2013 Illinois law and an executive order designated PAs as public employees for purposes of the Public Labor Relations Act, enabling unionization and fair-share fees; the State’s vicarious liability and benefit provisions for PAs are largely restricted.
- Three petitioners (PAs) sued claiming the agency-fee provisions violate the First Amendment; the Seventh Circuit upheld a broad Abood-based approach governing public employees.
- The Supreme Court held that, under these facts, the agency-fee provision infringes the First Amendment and declined to extend Abood to quasi-public/partial-public employees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Illinois may compel PA nonmembers to pay a union fee. | PA claim: agency fee violates First Amendment rights. | Quinn/SEIU argue Abood supports compelled fees for public employees. | Agency fees unconstitutional for Rehabilitation Program PAs. |
| Whether Abood applies to partial public employees (PAs) who are not full-fledged state employees. | Abood should control; PAs are public employees for bargaining purposes. | Abood rests on flawed foundations; extending it is improper. | Abood not controlling; cannot be extended to this group. |
| Whether, in any form, the agency-fee could be upheld under Pickering-based or other frameworks. | Even under Pickering, compelled fees undermine First Amendment rights. | Argument re Pickering is inadequate to sustain fees. | Agency-fee cannot be sustained under applicable standards. |
Key Cases Cited
- Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (U.S. 1977) (public-sector agency fees distinguished from political expenditures; upholds fee for collective bargaining)
- Hanson v. Railway Employes, 351 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1956) (limited to private-sector union-shop context; set labor-peace rationale)
- Street v. Southern Railway, 367 U.S. 74 (U.S. 1961) (public-speech concerns about political use of union funds; remedies discussed)
- Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507 (U.S. 1991) (multifactor test for chargeable/unchargeable union expenses)
- Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (upholds bar dues for ethics regulation; aligns with public employee speech framework)
- Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (U.S. 2000) (university student fees; viewpoint neutrality in funding expressive activities)
- Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (U.S. 2009) (public-sector labor relations; First Amendment considerations)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (speech of public employees in the workplace; Pickering framework)
- Umbehr v. Board of County Comm’rs, 518 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1996) (public-contract employee ownership of First Amendment protections)