Harris v. OHNH EMP, L.L.C.
37 N.E.3d 1256
Ohio Ct. App.2015Background
- Gerald A. Harris was hired as laundry/housekeeping supervisor at Wyant Woods (skilled nursing facility) in Dec. 2011; salary $1,760 biweekly ($22/hr based on 40 hrs); position classified as exempt and not paid overtime.
- Harris performed both managerial tasks (scheduling, discipline, evaluations, supply orders, training, attendance monitoring) and manual labor (cleaning, running floor machines); parties dispute the time split.
- Harris suffered an on-the-job injury on Apr. 4, 2012, filed a workers’ compensation claim, returned with work restrictions and transitional-duty paperwork; Wyant Woods resisted some medical requests and restricted certain tasks.
- Harris was disciplined more frequently after the injury according to his evidence, received a negative audit in early June, and was terminated on June 8, 2012; he had retained an attorney about a week earlier and missed work June 7 for treatment.
- Harris sued claiming (1) discharge in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation (R.C. 4123.90), (2) unpaid overtime (R.C. 4111.03), and (3) retaliation for complaining about unpaid overtime (R.C. 4111.13). Trial court granted summary judgment for employer. On appeal the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether employer retaliated in violation of R.C. 4123.90 for filing workers’ compensation | Harris: temporal proximity, increased negative performance feedback after injury, denial of MRI, absence for treatment, retaining counsel, and disparate treatment of similarly situated non-injured supervisor show causal connection and pretext | Wyant Woods: terminated for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons (poor performance, missed deadlines); any proximity is insufficient and employer followed non-retaliatory process | Reversed as to this claim — genuine issues of material fact exist as to causation and pretext; remand for trial |
| Whether Harris was entitled to overtime under R.C. 4111.03 (FLSA exemptions) | Harris: substantial non-managerial/manual work (argued ~75%) so executive exemption does not apply | Wyant Woods: Harris’s duties were primarily managerial (scheduling, discipline, evaluations, training, supply orders, relative autonomy), so executive exemption applies | Affirmed as to overtime claim — summary judgment for employer proper because Harris was an exempt executive employee |
| Whether claim under R.C. 4111.13 for retaliation based on complaining about unpaid overtime is viable (mootness) | Harris: statute protects complaints about unpaid wages; claim not moot even if he ultimately was not owed overtime because employer could still have retaliated for complaint | Wyant Woods: claim moot because Harris was correctly classified as exempt and therefore not owed overtime | Reversed in part — trial court erred to deem the claim moot; remand for consideration of merits (trial court to decide remaining disputed issues) |
| At summary judgment standard, whether employer met its burden to show no genuine issue of material fact on contested elements | Harris: raised specific facts (documents, affidavits, deposition testimony) creating triable issues on causation, pretext, and factual disputes about duties/time allocation | Wyant Woods: pointed to documentation of performance issues and exemption elements to support summary judgment | Court: viewed record in plaintiff’s favor; found factual disputes on retaliation/pretext and affirmed exemption finding on managerial primary duty; remanded remaining claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (summary judgment standard under Civ.R. 56)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (party opposing summary judgment must produce specific facts showing genuine issue)
- White v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr., 150 Ohio App.3d 316 (R.C. 4123.90 — employer may fire employee unable to perform duties; statute protects against discharge in direct response to workers’ compensation claim)
- Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496 (examining actual duties, not labels, in applying executive exemption)
- Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290 (exemptions to FLSA construed narrowly)