Harris v. O'Hare
770 F.3d 224
2d Cir.2014Background
- On December 20, 2006, Hartford officers O’Hare and Pia, acting on a tip from George Hemingway (a gang member arrested that day), entered the fenced front yard/side yard of 297 Enfield Street without a warrant seeking two guns allegedly hidden in an abandoned gray Nissan Maxima in the rear yard. No Maxima or guns were found.
- The officers entered with weapons drawn in a “tactical” posture, encountered and believed a Saint Bernard dog (Seven) was threatening them, and O’Hare shot and killed Seven in the front yard, in view of 12-year-old K.
- Plaintiffs (Harris and his daughter K.) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment illegal search/seizure and a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim) and state-law claims; defendants asserted lack of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, reasonableness, and qualified immunity.
- Weeks before trial defendants added the exigent-circumstances (and community-caretaking) affirmative defenses; the district court allowed presentation of evidence and later instructed the jury on exigency.
- The jury found for defendants and answered special interrogatories finding exigent circumstances; district court denied plaintiffs’ post-trial motions.
- On appeal the Second Circuit held there was sufficient evidence for probable cause to investigate Hemingway’s tip but concluded there was insufficient evidence of exigency to justify the warrantless entry into curtilage; it reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages and denied qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the area entered was curtilage | Harris: side/backyard is curtilage as a fenced-in, adjacent area used for home life | Defendants: entry was not a Fourth Amendment search because not curtilage | Court: did not decide as error harmless — jury’s exigency finding assumed curtilage existed |
| Whether officers had probable cause to act on Hemingway’s tip | Harris: tip insufficient as matter of law | Defendants: tip was detailed and officers reasonably relied on it given Hemingway’s status and officers’ experience | Court: probable cause supported by record; denial of JMOL on probable cause affirmed |
| Whether exigent circumstances excused warrantless entry | Harris: no evidence of urgency; only a tip and no vehicle seen — no imminent risk or destruction | Defendants: guns move quickly; high-crime area and officers’ experience created urgency to seize guns immediately | Court: insufficient evidence of exigency; generalized high-crime testimony and tip alone cannot justify warrantless intrusion; instruction on exigency was erroneous and prejudicial |
| Whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity | Harris: violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment rights (warrant or probable cause + exigency required) | Defendants: objectively reasonable belief their conduct was lawful given gun-tip and high-crime context | Court: no qualified immunity — law clearly established that fenced, adjacent yard is curtilage and mere tip/high-crime context did not make warrantless entry lawful |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (curtilage factors framework)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause as totality-of-the-circumstances for informant tips)
- United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (totality test for exigent circumstances)
- United States v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 1995) (firearms plus other factors can support exigency)
- United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271 (2d Cir. 1996) (curtilage can extend to enclosed on-site structures and uses of property)
- United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (Dorman factors and evidence-destruction consideration)
- United States v. Simmons, 661 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2011) (warrantless home entries presumptively unreasonable; exigency requires urgent need)
- Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (probable cause alone cannot justify warrantless dwelling entry)
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (front porch as exemplar of curtilage protection)
