Harris v. Hilderbrand, 2022 Ohio 1555

Defendant Dustin Hilderbrand, a Belmont County K-9 deputy, was required by his job to keep and care for his assigned police dog (Xyrem) at home.
Hilderbrand hosted a backyard cookout where he demonstrated Xyrem’s police training before dinner; the dogs were put inside to eat and returned to the yard after about 30–60 minutes.
Approximately one hour after the demonstration and with no commands given, Xyrem jumped up and bit plaintiff Allison Harris; she required medical treatment and sued for negligence and under Ohio’s strict-dog-liability statute.
Hilderbrand admitted the bite but moved for summary judgment asserting employee/political-subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744; the trial court granted immunity on the strict-liability claim but denied it as to the common-law negligence claim (left for the jury).
On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh District reversed: it held Hilderbrand was entitled to immunity as a matter of law on the negligence claim (R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a)) and, though the cross-appeal was untimely, agreed that R.C. 955.28(B) (strict dog-liability) does not expressly impose civil liability on a political subdivision’s employee.
Judge D’Apolito dissented, arguing prior incidents involving the dog created genuine factual disputes and the immunity question should go to the jury (or be remanded for trial-court findings).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hilderbrand is entitled to employee immunity for the negligence claim under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a) (acts "manifestly outside" scope)	Harris: hosting the demonstration and allowing the dog at a social event placed Hilderbrand manifestly outside his official duties; factual disputes preclude summary judgment	Hilderbrand: housing/caring for the K-9 is an official duty; the bite occurred off-duty, after a time gap, and was not during police commands—immunity applies	Court held Hilderbrand entitled to immunity as a matter of law; no genuine issue that his acts were manifestly outside scope
Whether R.C. 955.28(B) (strict dog-liability) expressly imposes civil liability on an employee so as to overcome immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c)	Harris: the statute makes a keeper strictly liable, which includes a K-9 handler, so immunity is abrogated	Hilderbrand: R.C. 955.28(B) does not expressly impose civil liability on political subdivisions or their employees; the immunity exceptions require an explicit statutory imposition of civil liability	Court concluded R.C. 955.28(B) does not expressly impose civil liability on an employee; immunity on the strict-liability claim was proper (cross-appeal untimely but merits addressed)

Hubbell v. Xenia, 873 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 2007) (denial of immunity is final appealable order; appellate standard is de novo review)
Byrd v. Smith, 850 N.E.2d 47 (Ohio 2006) (summary-judgment burdens in immunity context; movant’s initial burden)
Dresher v. Burt, 662 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1996) (nonmoving party’s reciprocal burden to produce evidentiary material showing genuine issue)
In re T.B.Y. v. Martins Ferry, 78 N.E.3d 242 (Ohio App.) (R.C. 955.28(B) does not expressly impose civil liability on a political subdivision or its employees)
O'Toole v. Denihan, 889 N.E.2d 505 (Ohio 2008) (summary judgment appropriate where undisputed facts show immunity exceptions inapplicable)
Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel, 344 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1976) (scope-of-employment principles; factual issues ordinarily for jury)