Harris v. Hardy
680 F.3d 942
7th Cir.2012Background
- Harris was convicted in 1984 of murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, and attempted armed robbery; death sentence on murder later commuted to life by Governor Ryan.
- Jury selection used a 'jury box' method over six rounds; the State struck numerous African American venire members; two African Americans served on the jury and one served as an alternate.
- Harris challenged the State's peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky; Illinois Supreme Court remanded for Batson hearing and later reviews occurred in Harris I, II, and III.
- Harris filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging Batson discrimination, ineffective Batson-counsel, and Brady concerns about impeachment evidence, with discovery ordered on Brady claim but overall denial by district court.
- The Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo the Batson questions and applied AEDPA standards; the court found unreasonable reliance on race-neutral explanations and pretextual justifications for strikes.
- The court vacated the district court’s denial, remanding with instructions to grant the writ unless Harris is retried within 120 days.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the State violate Batson by racially discriminatory peremptory strikes? | Harris argues pattern of strikes against African Americans shows purposeful discrimination. | State contends explanations were race-neutral and credible to rebut prima facie showing. | Yes; state court unreasonably credited race-neutral explanations; Batson violation established. |
| Was defense counsel ineffective for failing to establish Riley/Shealy's race at Batson hearing? | Harris contends counsel's failure prejudiced the Batson defense by omitting race at issue. | State argues no prejudice; race not established at hearing did not affect outcome. | Prejudice shown; Batson claim would have been stronger with race established. |
| May Brady claims concerning nondisclosed impeachment materials be resolved separately from Batson analysis? | Harris asserts Brady materials were improperly withheld affecting sentencing impeachment. | State contends Brady claim insufficient or overshadowed by Batson issues. | Brady issue deemed unnecessary to resolution given Batson relief; not decisive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (established three-step Batson framework for race-based jury strikes)
- Purkett v. Elem., 514 U.S. 765 (U.S. 1995) (per curiam; race-neutral explanations need not be persuasive at step two)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell (I), 537 U.S. 322 (U.S. 2003) (credibility and pretext in Batson third step; demeanor matters)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell (II), 545 U.S. 2317 (U.S. 2005) (comparative juror analysis; pretext evidence strengthens claim)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (U.S. 2008) (consider all relevant circumstances in Batson appealing to discrimination)
- Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1991) (demeanor and other nonstatistical cues inform discriminatory intent)
- United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (pretext and credibility assessment in Batson analysis)
- Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (U.S. 1977) (circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent)
- Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (U.S. 1976) (disparate impact and discriminatory intent framework)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (AEDPA standard for unreasonable application of law)