Harrington v. City of Davis
C081263
| Cal. Ct. App. | Oct 20, 2017Background
- Owners LeBlanc and Sanborn sought a conditional use permit (CUP) to use a single-family house in an R-3-M residential district as a professional office for three therapists; the house has a single-car garage and a 49-foot driveway.
- The property previously operated as a massage/acupuncture office under a 2003 CUP and building permit; accessibility upgrades (ramp, paved front area) were installed then; that CUP lapsed in 2011.
- LeBlanc's 2013 CUP application proposed no structural changes, described low-intensity office use, and showed an accessible parking area in the front yard (unmarked and not previously counted toward required spaces).
- Planning Commission approved the CUP with conditions (three on-site spaces in tandem, client parking guidance, privacy screening); staff and commission discussed accessible parking but did not make it a condition.
- City staff later determined (and the City Council affirmed on appeal) that the 2013 CUP did not change the building occupancy under the Building Code, so no new accessible parking was required; Harrington challenged the CUP and the accessibility determination in administrative proceedings and in a petition for writ of mandate, arguing violations of municipal parking setback rules and Building Code accessibility triggers.
- The trial court denied the writ; the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the CUP did not require front-setback accessible parking, the City's Building Code interpretation and factual findings were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, and other arguments were forfeited or inapplicable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CUP required accessible parking (and thus parking in front setback) | Harrington: CUP, by approving use and showing front accessible space, required an accessible space that would be in the front setback, violating §40.25.080(a) | City: CUP did not require accessible parking; staff/commission discussed accessibility but did not condition approval on it; required spaces provided behind setback | Court: CUP did not require accessible parking; no violation of setback rule |
| Whether CUP approval changed occupancy triggering Building Code accessible-parking requirements | Harrington: Approval changed use from residential to business, thus a change in occupancy triggering new-construction accessibility rules | City: Occupancy did not change because (a) prior change to B occupancy occurred in 2003 and never reverted by official action; (b) change in occupancy under Code requires building official approval/certificate of occupancy | Court: City’s interpretation entitled to deference; substantial evidence supports no change in occupancy; no trigger for new accessibility requirements |
| Whether contemplated alterations (porch screening, fence, sidewalk repair) trigger altered-portions accessibility rules | Harrington (raised on appeal): These alterations are "altered portions" under the Code and thus trigger accessibility obligations | City: Argument not raised administratively; no exhaustion of remedies; moreover, no finding that such alterations were required by CUP | Court: Argument forfeited for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; court did not reach merits |
| Whether City needed technical infeasibility findings or findings that CUP is consistent with R-3-M zoning | Harrington: If accessibility triggered, Council failed to make/find technical infeasibility and failed to adequately find CUP consistent with R-3-M purpose | City: Council did not rely on technical infeasibility (it found no accessibility trigger); Council made express consistency findings and record supports them | Court: Technical infeasibility findings unnecessary because Council did not invoke that theory; Council’s consistency findings sufficient and supported by substantial evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 1998) (degree of deference to agency statutory interpretation varies; greater deference where technical expertise and policy discretion involved)
- Anderson First Coalition v. City of Anderson, 130 Cal.App.4th 1173 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (agency interpretation of its own ordinance entitled to weight unless clearly erroneous)
- City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba, 215 Cal.App.4th 1068 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (courts give deference to a municipality’s interpretation of its ordinances)
- North Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 139 Cal.App.4th 1577 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (findings must enable parties and courts to understand basis for administrative action)