Harrington v. Citizens Property Insurance Corp.
2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 19116
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2010Background
- Harringtons owned Mozart Rd (primary residence) and Vallette Way (rental) in West Palm Beach; Citizens issued a $300,000 liability policy.
- Stuart Williams was injured at the Mozart property; Williams pursued a claim against the Harringtons seeking coverage under the Citizens policy.
- Citizens denied coverage, contending the policy covered only the Vallette property; Harringtons sought declaratory relief to cover Mozart as an insured location.
- “Insured Location” defined to include the residence premises or part of other premises used as a residence and shown in the Declarations.
- Trial court granted Citizens’ summary judgment, rejecting Harringtons’ view that Mozart fell within insured location; court relied on intent and asserted Mozart was not declared as residence premises.
- Appellate court reversed, holding the Mozart property meets the insured location definition under plain language, and ambiguities should be construed against the insurer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mozart property is an insured location | Harringtons argue Mozart qualifies as insured location under (b)(1) since it is part of premises used as a residence and shown in Declarations. | Citizens argues Mozart is not shown as residence premises in Declarations and thus not insured. | Mozart property qualifies under (b)(1) as other premises used as a residence shown in Declarations. |
| Proper interpretive standard for contract terms | Policy language should be read in plain meaning; ambiguity benefits the insured. | Court should not rewrite clear terms; strict construction when language is clear. | Ambiguities exist that should be construed against the insurer; objective interpretation applied, not insurer’s subjective intent. |
| Is there ambiguity requiring construction against insurer | The language used for insured location is ambiguous and should be construed in Harringtons’ favor. | Language is clear and unambiguous; no need for construction against insurer beyond plain terms. | When language is ambiguous, construe in favor of insured; here language supports coverage for Mozart. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sulkin v. All Fla. Pain Mgmt., Inc., 932 So.2d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (summary judgment standards; de novo review for contract interpretation)
- Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 29 So.3d 1000 (Fla.2010) (ambiguity standard for insurance contracts; interpret language)
- Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638 (Fla.1999) (summary judgment standard; clear and undisputed facts)
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1998) (strict construction does not mean torturing words; defined terms respected)
- State Comprehensive Health Ass’n v. Carmichael, 706 So.2d 319 (Fla.1997) (ambiguous terms considered in context of policy as a whole)
- Epstein v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 566 So.2d 331 (Fla.1st DCA 1990) (ambiguity and drafting; rejects vague terms; construed against insurer)
- Castillo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 829 So.2d 242 (Fla.3d DCA 2002) (plain and unambiguous policy terms interpreted as written)
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 639 So.2d 63 (Fla.3d DCA 1994) (ambiguity arises when multiple reasonable interpretations exist)
- Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 969 So.2d 288 (Fla.2007) (policy provisions interpreted by plain language when unambiguous)
- Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So.2d 161 (Fla.2003) (courts read terms with ordinary meaning; no unwarranted construction)