Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Kosin
2011 Ark. 51
| Ark. | 2011Background
- Harrill & Sutter, PLLC appeals a Garland County Circuit Court order discharging Harrill for cause and determining an attorney’s fee by quantum meruit under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-304, and Kosin cross-appeals for attorney’s fees under § 16-22-308.
- Kosin retained Harrill on a 2003 contingency fee (20% if settled, 30% if trial) to pursue estate claims including elective vs. will challenges and dower interests.
- Disputes arise over the Virginia estate sale, the handling of 941 taxes, and communications about settlement offers (notably a November 11, 2003 offer of $1 million) and related investments.
- The circuit court found Harrill discharged for cause and awarded quantum meruit fees of $55,775.44, with other trust distributions and lien-related orders.
- Kosin sought fees as the prevailing party, while Harrill argues the lien statute governs and that the court misapplied law and failed to adequately explain damages and fees on cross-appeal.
- The appellate court affirm direct appeal on the discharge-for-cause issue and reverse/remand on the cross-appeal for proper analysis under Chrisco factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discharge for cause: was Harrill fired for cause? | Kosin contends Harrill was discharged for cause; the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. | Harrill argues Kosin’s discharge was not for cause and the lien/fee should reflect contract or quantum meruit. | Yes; Kosin discharged Harrill for cause; court’s findings not clearly erroneous. |
| Quantum meruit vs. contract fee: proper fee after discharge for cause | Kosin asserts quantum meruit is appropriate under the lien statute after discharge for cause. | Harrill contends fee should be governed by the contingency-fee contract and lien principles. | Court appropriately awarded quantum-meruit recovery for Harrill. |
| Cross-appeal for attorney’s fees under § 16-22-308: proper analysis | Kosin, as prevailing party, is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees; trial court must apply Chrisco factors and justify the award. | Harrill argues fees should be denied or properly analyzed but contends the court erred in not applying Chrisco factors. | Remand for explicit Chrisco-factor analysis; error to deny without justification. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crockett & Brown v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363 (1993) (attorney discharged for cause may recover on a quantum meruit basis when evaluating fees)
- McDermott v. McDermott, 336 Ark. 557 (1999) (contingent-fee contract does not bar reasonable compensation when discharged for cause)
- Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197 (1995) (discharge for cause inferred from client-attorney communications and conduct)
- Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 825 (2003) (discharged attorney may be compensated via reasonable value of services)
- Mobley Law Firm, P.A. v. Lisle Law Firm, P.A., 353 Ark. 828 (2003) (necessity of substantial Crockett & Brown analysis for quantum meruit awards)
- Marcum v. Wengert, 344 Ark. 153 (2001) (fitness of trial judge’s discretion in attorney-fee determinations)
- Chisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227 (1990) (Chrisco factors guiding attorney-fee awards to prevailing party)
- Little Rock Wastewater Utility v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 321 Ark. 303 (1995) (requirement for explicit explanations when denying attorney’s fees)
- Whetstone v. Chadduck, 316 Ark. 330 (1994) (remand to consider fee awards with proper analysis)