Harriet Curles v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc.
343 Ga. App. 719
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Amy Kern had a long history of psychotic breaks and violent conduct; she was involuntarily committed to Focus by the Sea three times between Nov. 2008 and Jan. 2009 and was discharged on January 26, 2009. Twelve days later she killed Donna Kern and William Chapman.
- Plaintiffs filed an original wrongful-death complaint (Feb. 4, 2011) alleging ordinary and medical negligence against Focus, its operators (HHC), treating providers, PSI, UHS and others; an expert affidavit accompanied the original complaint.
- Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the Corporate Defendants (PSI/UHS) in 2013, then filed a renewal complaint in May 2014 that did not include an expert affidavit; the court consolidated/added the Corporate Defendants back.
- Plaintiffs amended and ultimately filed a Third Complaint alleging (inter alia) Count II: negligence per se for failing to give statutorily required discharge/notice (OCGA §§ 37-3-24/95/4), and Count III: ordinary negligence for discharging Amy pursuant to a corporate policy (e.g., discharge when insurance stops paying).
- The trial court dismissed the Third Complaint, treating Counts II and III as medical malpractice (invoking the medical-malpractice affidavit and statute-of-repose rules) and rejecting relation-back to the original complaint; the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Count II (failure to give statutory discharge/notice) is medical malpractice or ordinary negligence/negligence per se | Count II alleges violation of statutory notice/discharge duties (OCGA §§ 37-3-24/95/4) — not an exercise of professional judgment, so it is negligence per se/ordinary negligence | Count II arises from patient care/discharge decisions and thus is medical malpractice subject to expert-affidavit and statute-of-repose rules | Court: Count II sounds in negligence per se/ordinary negligence (statutory duty to give notice), not medical malpractice; dismissal on malpractice grounds was error |
| Whether Count III (discharge pursuant to corporate policy/insurance cutoff) is medical malpractice or ordinary negligence | The discharge was driven by a corporate policy (e.g., release when insurance stops), not professional medical judgment, so Count III alleges ordinary negligence under Bradley Center duty-to-control theory | Defendants claim discharge decisions are medical judgments implicating malpractice rules (expert affidavit/statute of repose) | Court: Count III states an ordinary negligence claim (duty to control dangerous patient to protect third parties per Bradley Center); malpractice dismissal was error |
| Whether the Third Complaint relates back to the Original Complaint (statute of limitations) | The renewal/third complaints assert substantially the same theory (discharge because insurance stopped paying) so they relate back under OCGA § 9-11-15(c) | Defendants argue the later negligence theory is an untimely, independent claim that does not relate back | Court: Allegations are substantially similar; negligence claims relate back and are not barred as independent untimely claims |
| Vicarious liability / corporate-defendant status and equitable-estoppel defenses | Plaintiffs argued the Corporate Defendants may be vicariously liable for Focus/HHC releases and that malpractice repose defenses were not properly raised/should be estopped | Defendants sought dismissal of UHS/PSI and raised statute-of-repose and affidavit defenses | Court: Because claims survive as ordinary negligence/negligence per se and relate back, dismissal was improper; the court did not decide propriety of adding UHS/PSI (no cross-appeal) and did not reach equitable-estoppel issues tied to malpractice repose |
Key Cases Cited
- Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 161 Ga. App. 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (adopting duty-to-control dangerous mental patients to protect third parties; ordinary negligence theory)
- Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 (Ga. 1982) (Supreme Court plurality affirming Bradley Center’s application of traditional negligence principles, not malpractice)
- Carter v. Cornwell, 338 Ga. App. 662 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (distinguishing statutory duties from professional judgment in discharge contexts)
- MCG Health, Inc. v. Casey, 269 Ga. App. 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (statutory duties separate from professional judgment can give rise to non-malpractice claims)
- Baldwin v. Hosp. Auth. of Fulton Cty., 191 Ga. App. 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (no duty to third parties where patient had not threatened or harmed others)
- Burns v. Dees, 252 Ga. App. 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (renewal/relation-back requires the renewed claim be substantially the same as the original)
- Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, 292 Ga. App. 411 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (standards for dismissal for failure to state a claim)