Harper v. State, 429 P.3d 1071

Background

Scottye Miller, on DOC-supervised probation with a court-ordered no-contact directive regarding Tricia Patricelli, was released from confinement and killed Patricelli 15 days later. DOC had imposed multiple supervision conditions, including reporting, treatment, and consent-to-home-visits requirements.
Prior to Miller’s release, a DOC victim liaison (Coker) contacted Patricelli multiple times, assisted with relocation paperwork, and received assurances that Patricelli would not resume contact and would call police if Miller appeared.
Miller reported to his DOC supervisor (Freeland) after release, submitted negative UA tests, provided a signed weekly shelter log (signed by his mother) showing he stayed with his mother, and took steps toward domestic-violence treatment. Freeland called Miller’s mother and Coker to verify arrangements.
Unknown to DOC, Miller and Patricelli had secretly renewed their relationship and Miller was living with Patricelli; Miller, his mother, and Patricelli actively concealed that fact from DOC and family members.
Harper (Patricelli’s mother) sued DOC for wrongful death and related claims, alleging DOC was grossly negligent in supervising Miller (e.g., failing to verify residence, conduct home visits, impose GPS/geofence monitoring, or otherwise ensure compliance with the no-contact order).
The trial court granted summary judgment for DOC; the Court of Appeals reversed. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed and reversed the Court of Appeals, holding Harper failed to produce substantial evidence of gross negligence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether DOC was grossly negligent in supervising Miller’s no-contact and probation conditions	Harper: DOC failed to take basic verification steps (home visits, call both numbers, verify mother’s statements, GPS, social-media monitoring) and thus exercised substantially less than slight care	DOC: took reasonable steps (victim liaison contact, relocation assistance, shelter logs, calls to mother and liaison, drug testing, treatment referrals); plaintiff’s evidence shows at most ordinary negligence	Held: DOC was not grossly negligent; reasonable minds could not differ that DOC exercised slight care; summary judgment for DOC affirmed
Standard for surviving summary judgment in gross-negligence claims against DOC	Harper: disputed—Court of Appeals suggested jury usually decides fine-grained negligence distinctions	DOC: plaintiff must produce substantial evidence of serious negligence (failure to exercise slight care) to survive summary judgment	Held: Plaintiff must present substantial evidence of serious negligence; courts may decide gross negligence as matter of law when reasonable minds cannot differ
Scope of DOC’s "take charge" duty regarding third-party harm	Harper: DOC’s prior knowledge of Miller’s violence and history of violating orders created a heightened duty to prevent contact	DOC: acknowledged a take-charge duty but contends its supervisory actions satisfied that duty under the circumstances	Held: DOC owed a take-charge duty, but its actions (considered in whole) met the slight-care threshold required to avoid gross negligence liability
Proper focus when evaluating relevant failure on summary judgment	Harper: DOC’s omissions (failures to verify) are the relevant failures	DOC: court must consider both omissions and affirmative steps taken by DOC	Held: Under Nist framework, courts must identify the specific alleged failure and evaluate all evidence (what defendant did and did not do); here comprehensive review favored DOC

Key Cases Cited

Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wn.2d 322 (1965) (defines gross negligence as failure to exercise slight care and directs courts to identify the specific alleged failure when ruling on summary judgment)
Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265 (1999) (standard of review for summary judgment; view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195 (1991) (articulates "take charge" duty for supervising persons likely to cause harm)
Binschus v. Dep't of Corr., 186 Wn.2d 573 (2016) (discusses government liability and special relationships in supervision contexts)
Joyce v. Dep't of Corr., 155 Wn.2d 306 (2005) (recognizes duty of community corrections officers)
Swank v. Valley Christian Sch., 188 Wn.2d 663 (2017) (noting fine-grained factual analysis for negligence distinctions but affirming courts may decide such issues when facts undisputed)
LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn.2d 154 (1975) (explains courts are not precluded from deciding negligence/proximate cause on summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists)
Bishop v. Miche, 137 Wn.2d 518 (1999) (recognizes duties of probation-related officers)
Petersen v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421 (1983) (discusses governmental duty to protect third parties absent special relationship)