Harper v. State, 298 Ga. 158

Victim Rajib Sarkar managed a convenience store; nightly he took the day’s proceeds (typically $2,000–$4,000, higher on weekends) to his apartment to count before banking them the next day.
Mark Anthony Harper worked next door at a car wash and had a romantic relationship with Sarkar’s wife, Stephanie; Harper asked her about Sarkar’s money and routines and visited the couple’s apartment.
James Clark (car-wash coworker) testified Harper recruited him to rob Sarkar, suggesting the robbery occur at the apartment parking lot; Harper stayed in contact by phone and relayed when Sarkar was returning home.
On Oct. 2, 2011, Clark ambushed Sarkar in the parking lot, shot him multiple times (killing him), and stole about $6,000; Clark later delivered Harper’s share per Harper’s directions and disposed of the gun.
Harper was indicted and convicted as a party to robbery, armed robbery, and felony murder (while committing armed robbery); the jury sentenced him to life for felony murder while in the commission of armed robbery.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence for felony murder as a party	State: evidence (Clark’s testimony, cell records, inmates’ statements) shows Harper planned, facilitated, and directed the robbery that resulted in murder	Harper: evidence is circumstantial and fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; witnesses (Clark and inmates) unreliable	Affirmed: viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could find Harper guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
Whether Harper was a party to the crime	State: Harper intentionally aided/abetted and procured Clark to commit robbery (recruitment, communication, sharing proceeds)	Harper: challenged as insufficient and unreliable to prove party liability	Affirmed: party status may be inferred from conduct before, during, after the crime; evidence supported inference
Characterization of evidence (direct vs. circumstantial) and witness credibility	State: Clark’s and inmates’ testimony are direct evidence of Harper’s guilt; jury decides credibility	Harper: testimony is unreliable and should be treated as circumstantial, failing OCGA § 24-14-6 test	Affirmed: testimony is direct evidence; credibility is for the jury and does not convert direct into circumstantial evidence

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency review — whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
Mickens v. State, 277 Ga. 627 (2004) (do not reweigh evidence; review in light most favorable to verdict)
Conway v. State, 281 Ga. 685 (2007) (party to a crime may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct)
Evans v. State, 288 Ga. 571 (2011) (distinguishing direct and circumstantial evidence)
Brown v. State, 251 Ga. 598 (1983) (treatment of direct evidence)
Lewis v. State, 296 Ga. 259 (2014) (credibility problems do not convert direct evidence into circumstantial)
Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506 (2013) (weight and reliability of testimony are for the jury)
Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (1993) (merger principles affecting sentencing and vacatur of duplicative convictions)