Harper v. State
121 A.3d 24
Del.2015Background
- Margaret Smith, an 89-year-old, was given a ride by two teenage girls (age 14 and 15); the girls took her car and forced her into the trunk.
- The girls later picked up Phillip Brewer and then respondent Rondaiges Harper; Harper joined after Smith had already been put in the trunk and after the car had been taken.
- Harper learned someone was in the trunk, opened it, removed Smith, then (with others) forced her back into the trunk; Smith remained captive for many hours and was later abandoned in a cemetery and rescued.
- Harper was tried and convicted of first‑degree carjacking, first‑degree kidnapping, and two counts of second‑degree conspiracy; he appealed, arguing the carjacking was complete before he joined and thus he could not be convicted as a principal/accomplice.
- The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed whether Delaware's carjacking statute creates a continuing offense and whether evidence supported kidnapping and conspiracy convictions.
- The Court reversed Harper’s convictions and remanded, holding Delaware carjacking is not a continuing crime and the evidence was insufficient for kidnapping and conspiracy convictions tied to the carjacking.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Harper) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether carjacking is a continuing offense | Carjacking continues while victim is held hostage; federal abduction rule applies | Carjacking completed when possession/control was taken (before Harper joined); cannot be convicted as accomplice to completed crime | Carjacking is not a continuing crime under Delaware law; completed when elements satisfied; Harper’s carjacking conviction reversed |
| Sufficiency of evidence for 1st‑degree kidnapping (predicate: carjacking or flight) | Harper’s participation while victim restrained supports kidnapping conviction | Harper joined after carjacking was complete and there was no evidence restraint was to facilitate flight; insufficient mens rea/purpose | Evidence insufficient to show Harper restrained Smith to facilitate carjacking or flight; kidnapping conviction reversed |
| Sufficiency of evidence for 2nd‑degree conspiracy (to carjack/kidnap) | Participation and group acts establish agreement and overt acts | No proof Harper agreed to carjack or to restrain Smith to facilitate carjacking/flight; no overt act in furtherance before he joined | No evidence of agreement or shared purpose re carjacking/kidnapping; conspiracy convictions reversed |
| Whether to adopt federal "abduction rule" (carjacking continues until victim separated) | Urges adoption of federal precedent treating carjacking as continuing while victim held | Delaware statute differs in wording; legislative intent and common law support discrete taking at a point in time | Court declined to import federal abduction rule; Delaware statute’s language and history indicate carjacking is completed upon taking possession/control |
Key Cases Cited
- Dennis v. State, 41 A.3d 391 (Del. 2012) (characterizes carjacking as a crime against the person)
- United States v. Figueroa‑Cartegena, 612 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2010) (federal panel applying the abduction rule to carjacking; treated with skepticism)
- United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996) (adopted abduction rule: carjacking not complete until victim separated from vehicle)
- Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) (presumption against construing crimes as continuing offenses unless legislative intent appears)
- Williamson v. State, 669 A.2d 95 (Del. 1995) (interpreting "flight" from predicate felony as fleeing from scene)
- Cook v. State, 600 A.2d 352 (Del. 1991) (legislature may permit separate punishments for related offenses; discussed in legislative intent context)