Harper v. Lindon City
2:18-cv-00772
D. UtahJan 29, 2020Background
- Plaintiff George E. Harper purchased a home in Lindon, Utah to operate a residential inpatient treatment facility and sought a Fair Housing Act (FHA) reasonable-accommodation waiver of the city’s eight-person unrelated-occupants limit to house 16 patients.
- Lindon City Planning Director Hugh Van Wagenen denied the accommodation; Harper sued the City under the FHA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 instead of pursuing an administrative appeal.
- Intervenor-defendant Fair Care Lindon, LLC (neighbors) opposed Harper’s administrative request, successfully intervened in the federal case, and opposed Harper’s motions in court.
- The court denied Harper’s preliminary injunction after an evidentiary hearing. Harper then moved for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2); the City did not oppose, Fair Care did, but the court granted dismissal without prejudice.
- Fair Care moved to reconsider and to set aside judgment under Rules 59(e) and 60(b), arguing legal prejudice, new evidence that Harper intends to open the facility, that its intervenor status shouldn’t matter, and that the court should have imposed curative conditions or granted its anticipated summary-judgment relief. The court denied reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harper) | Defendant/Intervenor Argument (Fair Care) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fair Care’s prayer for declaratory/injunctive relief functions as a counterclaim that makes dismissal prejudicial | Harper: N/A (Harper opposed treating it as a counterclaim) | Fair Care: Its prayer effectively seeks affirmative relief akin to a counterclaim and thus dismissal prejudices it | Court: Prayer is not a counterclaim; Fair Care should have timely asserted a counterclaim or raised this in earlier briefing; no prejudice shown |
| Whether new evidence (TV appearance, website) shows Harper will open the facility so dismissal was improper | Harper: Statements by an employee and an old website post are speculative; no new permit filed; he is considering options | Fair Care: Post-dismissal publicity and website show concrete intent to open facility, making dismissal unfair | Court: Evidence is speculative; Harper has not reapplied and no concrete action undermines dismissal |
| Whether Fair Care’s intervenor status makes the prejudice analysis irrelevant | Harper/City: Prejudice is evaluated as to the party against whom the claim is asserted; Fair Care asserted no claims and had no counterclaims | Fair Care: Intervention was inevitable; it should not be disadvantaged because it was not initially named | Court: Intervenor status alone does not show prejudice where intervenor asserted no claims against plaintiff |
| Whether the court should have imposed curative conditions or dismissed with prejudice/ enjoined refiling | Harper: Court should not restrict future administrative filings; final administrative denial exists | Fair Care: Court should have imposed conditions (injunction, dismissal with prejudice) to prevent waste and alleged fraud | Court: Imposing injunctions or barring refiling would usurp City’s administrative authority and is speculative; no curative conditions warranted |
| Whether dismissal without prejudice deprived Fair Care of the relief it sought via its pending summary-judgment motion | Harper: Granting Fair Care’s motion would only have dismissed Harper’s claims; it would not produce broader zoning or future-application bar | Fair Care: Summary judgment would have established broader legal rules barring such inpatient facilities in the R1-12 zone | Court: Fair Care overstated relief; summary judgment would have dismissed Harper’s claims but not create the broad, preclusive rules alleged |
Key Cases Cited
- Nelson v. City of Albuquerque, 921 F.3d 925 (10th Cir.) (district courts’ discretion under Rule 59(e) is limited; interest in finality of judgments)
- United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534 (10th Cir.) (grounds for granting Rule 59(e) motions: intervening law, new evidence, or need to correct clear error/manifest injustice)
- Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir.) (Rule 59(e) is not for rehashing arguments that could have been raised earlier)
- Brown v. Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir.) (Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals may include curative conditions to prevent unfairness)
- Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354 (10th Cir.) (Rule 41(a)(2) context on unfair voluntary dismissals and curative conditions)
- Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.) (a defendant’s prayer for declaratory relief can, in some circumstances, function as a counterclaim)