Harold Temple v. Marsha McCall
2013 WL 3105036
5th Cir.2013Background
- Original owners Jenkins and Paul conveyed ~35.89 acres to the Sabine River Authority (SRA) in 1965 but expressly reserved mineral rights in that conveyed portion. Paul later acquired Jenkins’s remaining interests.
- In 1969 Paul sold a 15.5-acre surface parcel to R.V. Woods by credit deed that described the parcel as “All that part … lying West and South of the Public Road, LESS portion sold to Sabine River Authority.” It is ambiguous whether the “LESS” excluded only surface rights or also the underlying mineral rights previously reserved.
- Temple purchased the parcel from Woods in 2000 via a deed using substantially identical descriptive language and later executed mineral leases over the surface parcel. Paul’s heirs (including McCall) leased the disputed mineral rights beneath the SRA-conveyed surface to third parties.
- Temple sued (bench trial) claiming the 1969 and 2000 deeds conveyed the disputed mineral rights to him; the district court found for McCall, holding the deeds did not transfer those mineral rights. Temple appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed factual findings for clear error and legal issues de novo, applied Louisiana substantive law, accepted expert testimony on customary deed interpretation, and affirmed the district court: McCall owns the disputed mineral rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1969/2000 conveyances transferred the mineral rights reserved in 1965 | Temple: the deed language ("all that part … less portion sold to SRA") conveyed all rights to the described tract, so mineral rights passed | McCall: the descriptive "all that part…less" language customarily describes surface area only; mineral rights remained reserved and were not expressly conveyed | Held: Deeds ambiguous; expert testimony on customary usage shows description was of surface area only — mineral rights were not conveyed to Temple |
| Whether the Court of Appeal decision in Sheridan v. Cassel controls | Temple: Sheridan holds mineral rights must be expressly reserved; similar "all rights" language means Sheridan governs | McCall: Sheridan’s facts and instruments differ; its "all rights" language and additional conveyance/assignment made it distinguishable | Held: Sheridan is distinguishable and not controlling; its reasoning does not compel a different result here |
| Whether to make an Erie guess about Louisiana Supreme Court direction | Temple: district court should follow Sheridan absent other persuasive data | McCall: expert testimony and factual distinctions justify a different Erie prediction | Held: Fifth Circuit predicts LA Supreme Court would accept expert usage evidence and reach same result — no departure from Sheridan required |
| Whether to certify the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court | Temple: request certification because state high‑court guidance is lacking | McCall: facts and law are sufficiently addressed; no compelling reason to certify | Held: Certification denied — no genuinely unsettled matter warranting certification and Temple failed to frame a certifiable question |
Key Cases Cited
- Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1967) (mineral rights remain attached to surface unless expressly detached)
- Texaco, Inc. v. Newton & Rosa Smith Charitable Trust, 471 So. 2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (ownership of immovable property determined from public records and deeds)
- Sheridan v. Cassel, 70 So. 3d 89 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (appellate decision holding mineral rights must be expressly reserved; facts distinguishable from this case)
- Par-Co Drilling, Inc. v. Franks Petroleum Inc., 360 So. 2d 642 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (use of customary trade usage to interpret ambiguous contract language)
- Jefferson Disposal Co., Inc. v. Jefferson Parish, 459 So. 2d 639 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (expert testimony admissible to establish received trade usage for interpreting ambiguous contract phrases)