Harold Hazard v. State of Rhode Island
64 A.3d 749
| R.I. | 2013Background
- Hazard was convicted of one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and four counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault.
- Hazard's trial involved disclosure of his confidential psychiatric records to the state without his knowledge or consent.
- Postconviction relief denied by the Superior Court; Hazard appealed challenging trial counsel's handling of the records, trial strategy, and closing arguments.
- The postconviction-relief court found deficient performance in several respects but concluded no prejudice to the trial outcome under Strickland.
- Court considered whether the disclosure harmed Hazard’s credibility relative to Lisa’s testimony and other corroborating evidence.
- Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding no prejudice established and defense arguments insufficient to meet Strickland prejudice standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prejudice from disclosure of records | Hazard contends disclosure prejudiced him and undermined trial fairness. | State argues overwhelming evidence supports conviction regardless of error. | No prejudice; evidence overwhelmingly supports guilt. |
| Racial-animus credibility strategy | Trial strategy to attack Lisa's credibility with racial animus was defective. | Strategy was reasonable tactical decision to test credibility. | Not deprived of effective counsel; no prejudice shown. |
| Closing argument—claims of lying | Prosecutor's calls to Hazard as a liar were improper; trial counsel should have objected. | References relied on evidence and were not unduly prejudicial; objections unnecessary. | Objections not required to be ineffective; comments not prejudicial given instructions. |
| Vouching in closing argument | Prosecutor improperly vouched for witnesses; trial counsel should have objected. | Vouching inconsequential given record and jury instructions; not prejudicial. | No reversible error; no prejudice shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. Supreme Court 1984) (two-prong deficient performance and prejudice standard)
- Brown v. State, 964 A.2d 516 (R.I. 2009) (strong evidence supports guilt; harmless error analysis in prejudice)
- State v. Horton, 871 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2005) (prosecutor closing remarks; demonizing comments disapproved)
- State v. Simpson, 658 A.2d 522 (R.I. 1995) (prosecutor closing remarks; admonition about personal opinions)
- State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467 (R.I. 2010) (definition of improper bolstering and prejudice review)
- State v. Rushlow, 32 A.3d 892 (R.I. 2011) (test for bolstering versus credibility testimony)
- Jaiman v. State, 55 A.3d 224 (R.I. 2012) (high deference to counsel performance; Strickland standard applied)
- Bustamante v. Wall, 866 A.2d 516 (R.I. 2005) (scope of reasonable assistance and tactical decisions)
- State v. Hak, 963 A.2d 921 (R.I. 2009) (instruction on credibility assessments and closing-argument impact)
- State v. Conway, 463 A.2d 1319 (R.I. 1983) (closing argument comments not evidence if properly instructed)
