301 So.3d 45
Miss. Ct. App.2019Background
- On March 6, 1991, Harold Hayes and Kevin Bryant struck Vivian B. Powell with an iron pipe during a robbery, killing her.
- A Lauderdale County grand jury indicted Hayes on two counts: Count I — capital murder (killing during commission of robbery); Count II — armed robbery.
- On July 2, 1992, Hayes pled guilty to capital murder; the court accepted the plea, dismissed the armed-robbery count (nolle prosequi), and sentenced Hayes to life imprisonment with possibility of parole and court costs.
- Hayes filed various post-conviction motions over the years; on June 19, 2017 he filed a PCR motion asserting his sentence was illegal because the underlying armed-robbery count was dismissed and asserting his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made.
- The circuit court denied the PCR, finding the capital-murder count stood on its own, the plea petition showed Hayes knowingly and voluntarily pled, and his motion was time-barred.
- Hayes appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding the PCR was time-barred and, on the merits, both the sentence and plea were proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / Procedural bar of PCR | Hayes argued PCR should be considered despite delay because sentence is illegal and plea involuntary (fundamental-rights exceptions) | State/court: PCR filed ~25 years after judgment and is outside §99‑39‑5(2) three-year window; Hayes did not meet exceptions | Court: PCR is time-barred; Hayes failed to prove an applicable fundamental-rights exception |
| Legality of sentence after dismissal of underlying felony | Hayes argued dismissal of armed-robbery count rendered his capital-murder sentence illegal and that his conviction should have been reduced | State/court: Capital-murder indictment contained independent elements; dismissal of separate count does not invalidate the conviction or sentence | Court: Sentence is not illegal; capital-murder charge stood on its own and sentence was within statutory limits |
| Voluntariness/knowing nature of guilty plea | Hayes claimed he did not fully understand the charge or consequences and thus plea was involuntary | State/court: Hayes signed sworn plea petition acknowledging counsel, knowledge of charges, waiver of rights, and understanding of consequences; trial court found plea voluntary, knowing, intelligent | Court: Hayes failed to prove by preponderance that plea was involuntary; plea was valid |
Key Cases Cited
- Lambert v. State, 941 So.2d 804 (standard of review for PCR denials)
- Swift v. State, 815 So.2d 1230 (a voluntary guilty plea waives the prosecution’s obligation to prove each element)
- Williams v. State, 126 So.3d 992 (bare assertions insufficient to overcome PCR procedural bars)
- Woods v. State, 71 So.3d 1241 (burden on movant to show plea involuntary by preponderance)
- Taylor v. State, 682 So.2d 359 (definition of voluntary plea: understanding elements, effect, and possible sentence)
- Hannah v. State, 943 So.2d 20 (defendant must be advised that guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights)
- Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521 (sentencing within statutory limits is within trial court’s discretion)
- Salter v. State, 184 So.3d 944 (identifies categories of fundamental-rights exceptions to PCR time bars)