76 So. 3d 862
Ala. Crim. App.2011Background
- Frost pled guilty in May 2008 to first-degree sodomy and two counts of sexual abuse of a child under 12; sentenced to life and 15 years on each count.
- No direct appeal was filed from these convictions.
- In August 2009 Frost filed a Rule 32 petition alleging lack of knowing plea, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and newly discovered evidence.
- He later amended to claim equitable tolling of the limitations period due to late discovery of parole ineligibility.
- An evidentiary hearing was held in January 2010; the circuit court denied relief on March 22, 2010.
- The court found trial counsel deficient for not informing Frost of parole ineligibility under § 15-22-27.3 and applied equitable tolling to toll the filing period; Frost appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel's failure to advise parole ineligibility violated Strickland | Frost | Frost | Counsel deficient; prejudice shown; reversal ordered |
| Whether § 15-22-27.3 parole ineligibility is a direct consequence of the plea | Frost | Frost | Direct consequence; not discretionary; requires correct advisement |
| Whether equitable tolling applied to the Rule 32 deadline | Frost | State | Court found extraordinary circumstances; tolling applied |
| Whether Padilla and related case law extend Strickland to deportation-like or collateral consequences | Frost | State | Padilla cited as controlling in direct-consequence analysis; applied for parole context |
| Whether Frost demonstrated a reasonable probability of going to trial but for counsel's error | Frost | State | Frost established prejudice; but focus on parole impact and sentence severity supports reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (Supreme Court, 2010) (deportation consequences can be a basis for ineffective assistance)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) (Supreme Court, 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985) (Supreme Court, 1985) (Strickland prejudice standard applies to guilty pleas)
- Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399, 402 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (Ala. Crim. App., 2002) (direct vs collateral consequences depend on immediate effect on punishment)
- Robinson v. State, 730 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (Ala. Crim. App., 1998) (direct vs collateral consequences inquiry for plea advice)
- Stith v. State, So. 3d (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (Ala. Crim. App., 2011) (counsel misadvised about statutory consequences; Halting guidance on incentives)
- Culver v. State, 549 So. 2d 568, 572 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (Ala. Crim. App., 1989) (prejudice shown when counsel's error undermines plea)
- Hill v. United States (as cited in context), 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (Supreme Court, 1985) (contextual support for Strickland framework in guilty-plea cases)