Harold B. Mason v. Georgia Department of Labor
697 F. App'x 690
11th Cir.2017Background
- Pro se plaintiff Harold Mason sued the Georgia Department of Labor and five of its employees, alleging hostile work environment, failure to promote, unfair termination, and retaliation related to his employment at Flint RiverQuarium, Inc.
- Mason captioned his claims under “42 U.S.C. § 1991” and otherwise referenced the Civil Rights Act of 1991; he also sought in forma pauperis (IFP) status.
- The district court granted IFP but dismissed the complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.
- The court explained § 1991 was inapposite (it concerns process-related appointments) and analyzed the complaint under § 1981 and Title VII, finding Mason failed to allege discrimination or retaliation by the named defendants.
- The court noted Mason’s alleged employer and the actors he targeted (Flint RiverQuarium employees) were not named as defendants and that related claims against Flint RiverQuarium had been litigated previously in Mason v. George.
- Mason’s motion for reconsideration (clarifying he meant the Civil Rights Act of 1991) was denied; he appealed and the court of appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether complaint states a § 1981 claim | Mason alleged racial discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation arising from his employment | Defendants argued Mason did not allege they (Dept. of Labor/employees) discriminated; allegations targeted Flint RiverQuarium staff | Dismissed — Mason failed to allege the named defendants intended to discriminate under § 1981 |
| Whether complaint states a Title VII claim | Mason alleged hostile work environment, failure to promote, wrongful termination, retaliation (invoking Civil Rights Act of 1991) | Defendants argued Title VII claims only run against an employer; Mason did not allege he worked for the Dept. of Labor nor that it committed the acts | Dismissed — no plausible Title VII claim against named defendants |
| Whether claims properly pleaded given citation to § 1991/Civil Rights Act of 1991 | Mason contended he meant the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (recoverable damages under Title VII) | District court found § 1991 citation was incorrect and clarified the relevant statutory framework; substantive pleading still deficient | Dismissed — citation error did not cure the absence of factual allegations against named defendants |
| Whether dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) was proper | Mason argued dismissal improper (moved for reconsideration) | Court applied liberal construction for pro se filings but evaluated legal sufficiency under § 1915 standards | Affirmed — sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003) (standard of review for sua sponte § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal)
- Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) (intent to discriminate is element of § 1981 claim)
- McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2008) (Title VII covers hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation claims)
- EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000) (Civil Rights Act of 1991 allows compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII)
- Mason v. George, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1254 (M.D. Ga. 2014) (prior litigation in which Flint RiverQuarium obtained summary judgment on related employment claims)