Harmon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
163 A.3d 1057
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2017Background
- Daniel Harmon (Claimant) pled guilty to driving with a suspended license and was sentenced to 60 days to be served as consecutive weekend (48-hour) incarcerations from March 14 to August 7, 2014.
- Harmon worked part-time before termination; employer later terminated him for unrelated reasons and he filed for unemployment effective March 23, 2014.
- The UC Service Center determined Harmon ineligible under 43 P.S. § 802.6 (Section 402.6) for weeks he was incarcerated and assessed an overpayment/penalty; a Referee upheld ineligibility but found no intentional nondisclosure, and the Board affirmed and converted the overpayment to non‑fault.
- Harmon appealed, arguing Section 402.6 requires continuous incarceration for an entire week to disqualify benefits, that the statute should be liberally construed in his favor, and that the Board’s reading conflicted with other provisions allowing partial-week eligibility.
- The Commonwealth Court held Section 402.6 ambiguous as to the word “during,” deferred to the Board’s reasonable interpretation that incarceration at any point in a week disqualifies the claimant, and affirmed the Board’s order.
Issues
| Issue | Harmon’s Argument | Board/State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §402.6 requires continuous incarceration for an entire week to disqualify benefits | “During” means “throughout the duration of” so partial-week (weekend) incarceration does not disqualify | “During” can mean “at a point in the course of,” so any incarceration during a week disqualifies | Court: statute ambiguous; agency interpretation reasonable; any incarceration during the week disqualifies |
| Whether legislative history or Chamberlain precludes applying §402.6 to weekend confinement | Legislative intent targeted work‑release/prison confinement that burdens taxpayers, not partial confinement allowing weekday work | §402.6 was meant to bar those actually incarcerated (including weekend confinement in facility) from benefits | Court: Chamberlain distinguished (house arrest different); §402.6 applies to confinement in correctional facility even if only part of week |
| Whether remedial purpose of UC law requires narrow reading of disqualification | Law is remedial; ambiguities should favor coverage—denying benefits for weekend confinement is punitive and undermines rehabilitation | Disqualification provisions may be narrowly construed, but §402.6 is an express ineligibility that applies regardless of ability/availability | Court: remedial purpose does not override explicit disqualification; Harmon conceded he was incarcerated, so ineligible |
| Whether §402.6 conflicts with other eligibility provisions (partial availability, part‑time earnings) | Consistency requires treating partial-week incarceration like partial availability under §401(d) so claimant could still be eligible | §402.6 is an ineligibility provision that operates independently of §401 eligibility criteria; they can coexist | Court: no conflict—eligibility rules differ from categorical ineligibility; §402.6 can bar benefits despite partial availability |
Key Cases Cited
- Chamberlain v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 114 A.3d 386 (Pa. 2016) (Supreme Court construed §402.6 to exclude certain prison work‑release situations but distinguished home confinement)
- Greer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 392 A.2d 918 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) (earlier decision allowing benefits for some work‑release inmates prior to §402.6 amendment)
- DeMoss v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 454 A.2d 1146 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (disqualifying conduct during any portion of a week results in loss of benefits for entire week)
- Penflex, Inc. v. Bryson, 485 A.2d 359 (Pa. 1984) (disqualification provisions should be narrowly construed; remedial statutes construed broadly)
- Walker v. Eleby, 842 A.2d 389 (Pa. 2004) (statutory construction principles: plain language controls and statutes should give effect to all provisions)