HARMON v. RAPIDCOURT, LLC
2:17-cv-05688
E.D. Pa.Nov 20, 2018Background
- Harmon applied to work for Uber; Uber hired Checkr to prepare a consumer background report. Checkr contracted with RapidCourt to obtain county criminal records.
- Harmon alleges RapidCourt transmitted to Checkr stale criminal charges (over seven years old and non‑convictions) that the FCRA forbids in certain consumer reports, and that RapidCourt failed to maintain accuracy procedures.
- Harmon claims emotional harms (embarrassment, frustration, fear of future reports) and administrative steps taken to clear his Checkr file; he admits Uber did not deny him employment.
- Checkr correspondence and the consumer report incorporated into the complaint show Checkr’s report to Uber was "clear" and that Checkr may have excluded vendor results from the final report.
- RapidCourt moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing (Rule 12(b)(1)) for FCRA Counts I–II and for failure to state a FACTA claim (Rule 12(b)(6)); the Court granted dismissal of Counts I–II and the FACTA claim, allowing Count III (request for file copy) to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing for FCRA claims (Counts I–II): whether disclosure to another consumer reporting agency alone creates Article III injury | Harmon: transmission of prohibited information to Checkr caused concrete harms (embarrassment, fear, administrative costs) sufficient for standing | RapidCourt: disclosure only to Checkr (a CRA) with no disclosure to employer or third parties and no adverse employment action is not a concrete injury | Court: No standing — disclosure solely to another CRA without dissemination to third parties or concrete harm is insufficient for Article III injury |
| Concreteness of alleged emotional/administrative harms under FCRA | Harmon: emotional distress and expenses are cognizable FCRA injuries for willful violations | RapidCourt: those harms are speculative or arise only from awareness that a CRA possesses information; Casella/Hyd e principle bars recovery absent disclosure to third parties or actual injury | Court: Emotional/administrative harms alleged here are not concrete because the allegedly prohibited information was not shown to have been reported to the employer or others |
| FACTA claim sufficiency (Count III headings referencing FACTA) | Harmon: invokes FACTA in count headings | RapidCourt: no FACTA provision or supporting facts pleaded | Court: Dismissed FACTA claims for failure to meet Rule 8 pleading requirements (no factual or statutory basis alleged) |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III injury requires concrete and particularized harm; statutory violation alone insufficient)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury in fact, causation, redressability)
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (purpose and scope of the FCRA)
- Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010) (FCRA recovery may include humiliation and embarrassment for concrete harms)
- Casella v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 56 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (no recovery for pain and suffering where erroneous CRA information was not disclosed to third parties)
- Hyde v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank in Jefferson Parish, 861 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1988) (statute does not create tort claim absent injury from disclosure to others)
- Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (courts may consider documents incorporated by reference when ruling on motions to dismiss)