Harley-Davidson Credit Corp. v. Galvin, 807 F.3d 407

In 2008 Eaglemark loaned RASair $250,000 for a Cessna 421C; Mark Galvin personally guaranteed repayment; Eaglemark assigned the loan and security agreement to Harley‑Davidson.
RASair defaulted in 2010; Harley‑Davidson repossessed the Aircraft in September 2011 and placed it with Specialty Aircraft Services, a dealer.
While in Specialty’s custody the Aircraft was vandalized and key avionics were removed; a logbook was also missing earlier, which decreased value.
Specialty sold the Aircraft privately on November 30, 2011 for $155,000 under an "as is" contract that included a promise to replace certain avionics.
Harley‑Davidson offset the sale proceeds, claimed a $108,681.50 deficiency from Galvin, and sued; district court granted partial summary judgment for Harley‑Davidson on commercial‑reasonableness, concluding use of a dealer sufficed.
The First Circuit reviewed whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact that the sale (including dealer handling after vandalism) was "commercially reasonable" under Nevada law and reversed and remanded.

Issue	Harley‑Davidson's Argument	Galvin's Argument	Held
Whether the sale of the repossessed Aircraft was "commercially reasonable" under Nevada law	Use of a recognized dealer (Specialty) demonstrates commercial reasonableness	Dealer’s conduct after repossession (vandalism, missing avionics, limited marketing) made the sale commercially unreasonable and depressed price	Reversed: dealer use alone insufficient; genuine dispute of material fact exists about commercial reasonableness
Who bears the burden at summary judgment on commercial reasonableness	Burden should shift to Galvin once dealer use shown	Harley‑Davidson, as the party with trial burden, must prove commercial reasonableness at summary judgment	Court: Harley‑Davidson bore burden at summary judgment; district court erred by prematurely shifting burden
Whether Galvin’s alleged consent or participation cures any defect	Consent or participation (email exchanges, prior discussions) renders sale reasonable	No evidence of express authorization of the November 30 sale; consent does not excuse unreasonable dealer conduct	Court: consent not shown; consent would not necessarily make an unreasonable sale reasonable
Whether price obtained ($155,000) forecloses inquiry into reasonableness	Price alone is dispositive	Sale price is a relevant factor but not dispositive; price may have been depressed by vandalism and dealer handling	Court: price alone insufficient; factual dispute whether vandalism/handling reduced price and interest of buyers

Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2015) (standard for reviewing summary judgment and drawing inferences for nonmovant)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (burden‑shifting principles on summary judgment)
Jones v. Bank of Nevada, 535 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1975) (use of a dealer recognized as reasonable only if sale is "fairly conducted")
Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 560 P.2d 917 (Nev. 1977) (sale price is a relevant factor in assessing commercial reasonableness)
Royal W. Airways, Inc. v. Valley Bank of Nev., 747 P.2d 895 (Nev. 1987) (creditor’s neglect or change in market value while in possession may render disposition unreasonable)
Iama Corp. v. Wham, 669 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1983) (courts scrutinize creditor conduct while in possession of collateral)
Piper Acceptance Corp. v. Yarbrough, 702 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1983) (debtor communications sometimes bear on disposition issues, but facts must show express authorization)