Harewood v. New York City Department of Education, 21-584-cv

Plaintiff Harriet Harewood, a former New York City Department of Education employee, sued the DOE and two officials alleging race- and age-based discrimination (Title VII and ADEA), hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation.
At issue were three personnel actions that the courts treated as potentially adverse: denial of per-session pay for an after-school art portfolio program and the placement of two disciplinary letters in her personnel file; other complaints were found not materially adverse.
The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants; Harewood appealed. The Second Circuit assumed (for some issues) that the three actions were timely and that Harewood could make out prima facie cases under McDonnell Douglas, but reviewed the merits of the defenses and pretext evidence.
Defendants justified the program-pay denial by budget constraints and low enrollment; they justified the disciplinary letters by student complaints and a formal investigation.
The Second Circuit held Harewood failed to rebut these non‑discriminatory reasons or show they were pretextual; her hostile-work-environment and constructive-discharge claims failed for lack of objective hostility and causation; her retaliation claim failed because the post‑retirement informational notices were not materially adverse.
The Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were the challenged actions materially adverse employment actions?	Harewood contended denial of program pay and disciplinary letters were adverse.	Only the pay denial and two letters qualify; other allegations are not materially adverse.	Court: Only three actions could qualify; most allegations were not materially adverse (Vega).
Were the defendants’ stated reasons pretext for race/age discrimination (disparate treatment)?	Harewood argued race/age motivated the actions and proffered evidence of discrimination.	Defendants gave legitimate, non‑discriminatory reasons (budget/enrollment; student complaints and investigation).	Court: Harewood failed to raise a triable issue of pretext; summary judgment for defendants.
Did Harewood prove a hostile work environment or constructive discharge?	Harewood claimed workplace was hostile and caused constructive discharge.	Defendants argued conduct was not objectively hostile nor shown to be because of protected traits.	Court: No objectively hostile/abusive environment shown; no causation; constructive discharge claim fails.
Was the issuance of informational disciplinary notices after retirement actionable retaliation?	Harewood said notices were retaliatory for prior complaints.	Defendants said notices were trivial and had no employment consequences.	Court: Notices were not materially adverse and would not deter a reasonable worker; retaliation claim fails.

Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (defines "materially adverse" change in employment terms)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for disparate treatment)
Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2015) (objective hostile‑work‑environment standard)
Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712 (2d Cir. 2010) (standards for constructive discharge from hostile environment)
Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 2014) (reasonable‑worker standard for retaliation adverse action)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation: materially adverse standard)