Hardy v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 513

Background

This is a Rails-to-Trails takings case: 112 landowners in Newton County, Georgia, claim a taking when the U.S. authorized conversion of a rail corridor to trail use (NITU issued Aug. 12, 2013).
Dispute centers on what interest the railroad (CGA / predecessor MG&AR) acquired from adjacent landowners in late 19th century deeds: easement limited to railroad purposes vs. fee simple title.
At summary judgment the court held some deeds (e.g., Armstrong and 29 others) conveyed railroad-purpose easements; several (including Lee, Hight, Henderson, Cannon, Robinson, Weaver) conveyed fee simple; certain municipal/road grants conveyed easements making adjacent owners own to the corridor centerline.
Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration under RCFC 59(a)(1), arguing (1) misapplication of Georgia deed interpretation standards for four deeds (Lee, Hight, Henderson, Cannon) and (2) error applying Georgia adverse-possession law to the strip adjacent to Parcel 97.
Court evaluated deed interpretation factors (granting language, “right-of-way” terminology, consideration, warranty clauses, reservations) and adverse possession requirements (public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted, peaceable possession with claim of right).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Nature of interests conveyed by Lee, Hight, Henderson, Cannon deeds	These deeds are like other easement deeds (low consideration); should be easements for railroad purposes	Some deeds, based on consideration and other clauses, conveyed fee simple	Court: Erred as to Lee deed (Lee conveys an easement); no error as to Hight, Henderson, Cannon (remain fee simple)
Role of consideration and deed language in Georgia deed interpretation	Consideration amounts ($100–$150) are not substantial; point to other deeds with lower amounts conveying easements	Consideration must be judged in historical/pro-rata context and alongside other deed terms	Court: Consideration was substantial in context (wages, parcel size); but Lee’s condemnation language and repeated “right-of-way” references weigh toward an easement
Whether railroad acquired fee simple vs. prescriptive easement for Parcel 97 by adverse possession	Railroad lacked color of title and thus only gained a prescriptive easement	Railroad’s long, exclusive, notorious possession and treatment of land as its own supported fee title by adverse possession	Court: Denies reconsideration — railroad obtained fee simple by adverse possession (met statutory elements and claim-of-right indicia)
Whether lack of color of title precludes fee title by adverse possession under Georgia law	Color of title required to claim fee title more quickly; plaintiffs argue absence means only easement results	Georgia law permits adverse-possession title (fee or easement) without color of title if statutory elements met	Court: Color of title not required; absence does not preclude fee title after statutory period; fee simple properly found for Parcel 97

Key Cases Cited

Presault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (deed construed in light of common law and state statutes existing at execution)
Atlanta Dev. Auth. v. Clark Atlanta Univ., 784 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. 2016) (deed examined in entirety to determine parties’ intent)
Askew v. Spence, 79 S.E.2d 531 (Ga. 1954) (controlling question: fee simple vs. railroad easement)
Seignious v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 311 S.E.2d 808 (Ga. 1984) (continuous railroad maintenance for decades can establish fee title by adverse possession)
Watkins v. Hartwell R.R. Co., 597 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. 2004) (railroad gained right-of-way by prescription under adverse-possession principles)
Jackson v. Sorrells, 92 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1956) (right-of-way generally treated as railroad easement)
Kelley v. Randolph, 763 S.E.2d 858 (Ga. 2014) (elements required to establish adverse possession)
Barber v. S. Ry. Co., 274 S.E.2d 336 (Ga. 1981) (distinguishing deeds conveying fee simple from those conveying easements)