Hardy v. Maloney
909 F.3d 494
| 1st Cir. | 2018Background
- In 1995 a Massachusetts jury convicted Jeffrey Hardy of first-degree murder for the April 1994 killing of Thomas Moran; Hardy is serving life without parole. Key trial testimony came from immunized witness Christopher Rogovich and witness Steven Murphy. Hardy claimed an alibi and a third-party culprit theory.
- Facts at trial: Hardy obtained a gun, drove the group to a park, shot Moran in the face, and Moran was later found with a gunshot wound and numerous stab wounds; other participants allegedly stabbed Moran. Murphy later recounted admissions by co-participants implicating Hardy.
- Hardy exhausted state remedies, sought federal habeas relief, and the district court denied his § 2254 petition; the First Circuit reviews whether the state court rulings were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
- Hardy raised claims including (1) erroneous omission and wording of jury instructions (Bowden/investigation and consciousness-of-guilt), (2) prosecutorial misconduct in closing, (3) admission of non-testifying co-conspirators’ statements (Bruton-related), and (4) refusal to grant a mistrial after spectators shouted at jurors during a view.
- The First Circuit affirmed, concluding the SJC’s rulings were not contrary to or unreasonable applications of Supreme Court precedent and that Hardy failed to establish due-process violations warranting habeas relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Omission of Bowden-style instruction on alleged investigative deficiencies | Hardy: Mathews requires instruction where evidence could raise reasonable doubt; omission deprived him of a recognized defense instruction | Commonwealth/SJC: Bowden is not a defense; Mathews’ language is dicta and Mathews addressed entrapment, not policing procedure instructions | Court: SJC reasonably applied precedent; omission not contrary to clearly established law and any prejudice was minimal (defense explored issues in closing) |
| Consciousness-of-guilt instruction wording | Hardy: Instruction risked unconstitutional burden-shifting (Francis) | Commonwealth/SJC: Instruction was permissive (“may consider”) not mandatory; permissive inferences allowed if reasonable | Court: Instruction permissible; inference reasonable from facts; no due-process violation |
| Prosecutorial misconduct in closing (immunity comments; vouching; attacking third-party theory) | Hardy: Prosecutor’s egregious remarks about immunity, witness credibility, and dismissing third-party theory infected trial | Commonwealth/SJC: Remarks were isolated, often invited or responsive to defense, and judge gave specific curative instructions; overall evidence was strong | Court: Under Darden/Donnelly/Young, SJC reasonably found no due-process violation given invited nature, curative instructions, and weight of evidence |
| Admission of co-conspirators’ out-of-court statements (Bruton) | Hardy: Admission of Murphy’s testimony quoting Sullivan/Allison violated Bruton and his confrontation rights | Commonwealth/SJC: Hardy was tried separately; statements were admissible against Hardy under joint-venture/evidentiary rules; severance avoids Bruton risk | Court: No Bruton problem; SJC reasonably found statements admissible and not fundamentally unfair under due process |
| Juror impartiality after extraneous comments during view; denial of mistrial | Hardy: Multiple jurors heard shouted accusations; mistrial required | Commonwealth/SJC: Trial judge conducted individual voir dire, jurors said they could be impartial, judge has broad discretion; not like pervasive pretrial publicity cases | Court: SJC reasonably affirmed denial of mistrial; factual credibility determinations defer to trial court and no clearly established Supreme Court rule required reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (describing entitlement to instruction for recognized defenses)
- Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (mandatory presumption instructions may violate due process)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (prosecutorial misconduct standard for due process review)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (inadmissible co-defendant statements at joint trial and Confrontation Clause)
- Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (state-law errors in jury instructions generally not basis for habeas absent fundamental unfairness)
- Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (single improper remark in extended trial may be cured by instruction)
- Young v. United States, 470 U.S. 1 (prosecutor's invited response can mitigate misconduct effect)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (severance and limiting prejudice among co-defendants)
- Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (massive publicity can deny fair trial)
- Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (pretrial publicity and juror prejudice may require reversal)
- White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (definition of unreasonable application standard under § 2254)
- Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (state law defines defenses/elements)