Hardaway v. Robinson, 655 F.3d 445

Holland Hardaway was convicted in 1994 of second-degree murder and related firearm offenses for shooting Detroit police officer Norman Spruiel during an undercover investigation.
Hardaway claimed he did not know Spruiel was a police officer and acted in self-defense after returning to a shop he believed would be robbed.
During deliberations, the jury reported being hopelessly deadlocked on Counts 1 and 2; the trial judge issued a supplemental Allen-like instruction encouraging continued deliberation and consideration of others’ views.
Defense objected to the supplement as coercive; after another deadlock, the jury ultimately convicted on Count 2 (second-degree murder) and the firearm charge, and acquitted on Count 1.
Hardaway was sentenced as a habitual offender to 40–80 years for murder and 5 years for the firearm offense; direct appeal was pursued but counsel failed to file a brief, leading to dismissal.
Hardaway sought state post-conviction relief, which addressed jury coercion and trial-counsel claims but not appellate-counsel claims; Michigan proceedings did not cure the lack of a direct appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Allen charge was coercive	Hardaway	Hardaway	No reversible coercion; overall instruction not unreasonable under AEDPA
Whether appellate-counsel failure to file a timely brief violated rights and whether collateral relief suffices as substitute	Hardaway	Respondent	Appellate-counsel failure requires relief; collateral review not an adequate substitute for direct appeal

Jenkins v. United States, 381 U.S. 445 (1965) (context for coercive-like language in jury instructions)
Flores-Ortega v. United States, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (presumption of prejudice when appellate counsel fails to file appeal)
Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969) (presumption of prejudice for failure to file an appeal obligates new appeal)
Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004) (one-sentence denial of relief not unambiguously merits decision; not an adequate substitute for direct appeal)
Dorn v. Lafler, 601 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (Flores-Ortega presumption of prejudice; collateral review not sufficient substitute for direct appeal)
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to first-tier direct review; importance of adjudication on the merits)
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005) (distinguishes direct review vs. state supreme review; policy on direct review importance)
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (verdict-urging charges and social costs of retrial acknowledged)